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Abstract
In the twenty-first century, it is time that Marxists updated the conception of socialist revolution they have
inherited from Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Slogans about the “dictatorship of the proletariat” “smashing the
capitalist state” and carrying out a social revolution from the commanding heights of a reconstituted
state are completely obsolete. In this article I propose a reconceptualization that accomplishes several
purposes: first, it explains the logical and empirical problems with Marx’s classical theory of revolution;
second, it revises the classical theory to make it, for the first time, logically consistent with the premises
of historical materialism; third, it provides a (Marxist) theoretical grounding for activism in the solidarity
economy, and thus partially reconciles Marxism with anarchism; fourth, it accounts for the long-term
failure of all attempts at socialist revolution so far. In serving these functions, the revision I propose finally
“modernizes” and corrects Marx’s conception of revolution.
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Introduction
The death of Marxism has been announced so many times that it might seem anachronistic to
reconsider Marx’s ideas yet again.1 In the twenty-first century, haven’t we moved beyond
Marxism? The answer, it seems, is no. For one thing, in recent years even the mainstream media
has suggested that the ghost of Marx is haunting the world. Articles are published with headlines
like “Why Marx was Right”2 and “Marx’s Revenge: How Class Struggle Is Shaping the World,”3
and mainstream economists like Paul Krugman and Nouriel Roubini invoke Marxism to explain
capitalism’s current crisis. Radical thinkers such as David Harvey and Richard Wolff have become
academic celebrities, and magazines like Jacobin are becoming more popular. In fact, a Gallup
poll in 2019 found that young Americans have just as positive a view of socialism as of capitalism.4
It seems, then, that reports of Marx’s death have been greatly exaggerated.
It is worth asking why Marxism is so resilient. On the most basic level, the answer is that class
struggle is indeed of central and perennial importance to human life. Since the emergence of social
classes thousands of years ago, individuals’ and groups’ access to resources has been determined
primarily by their positions in particular relations of production (or a “mode of production”)—and
of course access to resources is of unique importance to life, since it essentially determines one’s
ability to survive and to influence what happens in society. The way that economic production has
worked since class structures emerged is that certain classes of people have, through various
methods of “hard” and “soft” power, forced others to work for them, or rather to produce a surplus
that can be appropriated by the privileged or those with power. Whether people have been aware
of “forcing” others to work—or of being forced to work—is irrelevant; the point is that the system
has functioned in such a way that some people have had to be slaves, serfs, wage-laborers, etc.,
while others have been slaveowners, landed aristocrats, capitalists, etc.—i.e., have profited off
others’ labor (due to asymmetrical power relations). Exploiters and exploited have thus confronted
each other in a perpetual struggle, sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit, to have more power
and resources. The profound explanatory power of this analytic framework explains why academic
Marxism has for decades been relatively prominent even in a capitalist society.
Incidentally, a corollary of this emphasis on class struggle and class interests is equally valid: at
least if explanation is one’s goal, it is more fruitful to analyze “social being” than “consciousness.”
The former is more fundamental than the latter, in part because consciousness tends to be a
sublimation of social being. That is to say, ideologies, discourses, subjective identities, thoughts
and conceptions of all kinds are conditioned by such non-discursive things as economic realities,
institutional imperatives (the need to follow the rules of given social structures), physical
environments, and the basic necessities of biological survival to a far greater degree than the latter
are conditioned by the former. This is true with respect to both individuals and collectivities. For
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example, people in a particular social category will tend to have beliefs that legitimate their
economic interests and institutional roles. Slaveowners may well believe that slavery is moral or
divinely ordained; intellectuals will probably think that ideas or “discourses” are of tremendous
importance in structuring the world;5 capitalists will be prone to thinking that capitalism and greed
are natural and good. But even if some people manage to be more mentally independent than the
majority, that doesn’t matter much, because there are still overwhelming pressures for their
behavior to conform to social structures and institutional norms. And these are situated in a
material and economic context that is, on a broad scale, structured around the power and interests
of a “ruling class” (consisting of those who occupy the dominant positions in a society’s dominant
mode of production).
Thus, on the societal level too, consciousness and ideas are secondary to the configuration of
production relations, the resultant distribution of resources, and institutional structures in general.
Ideologies will tend to predominate that either legitimate or are compatible with the interests of
those people who have the most control over the most resources, i.e., the ruling class. As Marx
said, “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas.” True understanding of
social dynamics, therefore, necessarily exists on a materialist foundation.6
Aside from these general considerations, the obvious reason why Marxism keeps reappearing in
the broader culture is that Marx was basically right in his analysis of capitalism: the economy is
prone to crisis, class polarization has a pronounced tendency to increase (unless held in check by
other forces), the working class tends to be relatively or absolutely immiserated, people in general
are commodified and dehumanized in capitalist society, commodities are “fetishized,” and so forth.
In fact, all it takes is an unbiased mind to see that Marxian perspectives on all facets of capitalism
are extraordinarily penetrating: the writings of E. P. Thompson, Raymond Williams, Paul Sweezy,
Paul Baran, Ernest Mandel, Harry Braverman, David Montgomery, Robert Brenner, Erik Olin
Wright, Göran Therborn, Mike Davis, Thomas Ferguson, David Harvey, John Bellamy Foster, and
innumerable other academic Marxists of the last seventy years are sufficient to prove this. And of
course there are the writings of Marx and Engels themselves to consider, as well as of the second
generation of Marxists (roughly Lenin’s generation). In short, there is no question that Marxism is
here to stay.
Given the unique power of this intellectual system, it is wholly justified to reconsider what is
perhaps its weakest aspect, its theory of revolution. Marxists have traditionally been hostile to
worker cooperatives and the “solidarity economy” as a tool of revolution, but as we’ll see, a
properly understood Marxism is in fact strategically committed to such institutions. Even more
importantly, a reconsideration and modification of Marx’s theory of revolution will enable us to
understand how a transition to socialism, or something like it, can happen, and what role
cooperatives and other alternative “grassroots” institutions might play in that transition.
5
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These are big topics, and the discussion in this essay will necessarily be both wide-ranging and
schematic. The main point that ties it all together is that I reject what I see as Marx’s extreme
statism, and I do so for reasons that I think are more faithful to Marxism than his own statist
conception of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” is.7 I find it astonishing, in fact, that, as far as I
know, no one has ever appreciated the un-Marxian character of that conception, the fact that it
doesn’t follow logically from the basic premises of Marxism. Quite the contrary: one might even
argue that, in many respects, the spirit of anarcho-syndicalism is closer to the essence of Marx’s
thought than Leninism and statism are. This isn’t just an academic debate, by the way. For one
thing, Marxists should know what they are logically committed to, and in what respects Marx got
his own ideas wrong. It is also important to cleanse and update the theoretical system in order to
keep it a living force, to salvage its insights and put them to use in our own urgent struggles.
My rejection of Marx’s statism, i.e., his adherence (despite his internationalism) to the framework
of the nation-state, leads to my argument that only in the twenty-first century are we finally
entering the revolutionary period Marx and Engels looked forward to. That is, they got the timeline
wrong: international socialist revolution never could have happened in the nineteenth or twentieth
centuries, for reasons I explain later. Their impatience got the best of them. Only now is “the
nation-state system” beginning to deteriorate—and global revolution never could have happened
before this deterioration started. In part to explain why this is the case, and what it is about our
contemporary world that makes it so much more pregnant with international revolutionary
potential than the world of, say, a hundred-or-more years ago was, I briefly review the “historical
logic” of the evolution of capitalism and the nation-state into the neoliberal present. On the most
abstract level, one can view the last 150 years or so in the West as consisting of, first, a relatively
“pure” and “unregulated” capitalism that, through the conflicts it engendered between labor and
capital (and the resultant economic crises of “underconsumption” and “overproduction”),
necessitated the birth of the regulated Keynesian welfare state, in the heyday of the nation-state
era of history between the 1930s and 1970s. This period was the interregnum, so to speak, between
the first era of semi-“pure” capitalism and the second, which began in the 1980s and has continued
to the present. As before, the relative lack of robust government economic regulation and the
disempowerment of organized labor are leading to extreme social discontent and economic
crisis/stagnation. This time, however, the old nationalist Keynesian “compromise” is not a possible
solution, because the nation-state system is succumbing to the disintegrating effects of
transnational capital.
So, the current decline of the nation is the world-historic development that, together with the
emerging period of global economic stagnation, will make possible a (very protracted) social
revolution—centered not only around the national state but also around grassroots movements,
locally emergent cooperative modes of production, and transnational coordination of anti-capitalist
resistance. It was always inevitable that this was how the revolution would happen, as opposed to
un-Marxian fantasies of “the working class” (not a unitary entity) taking over national
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governments and directing economic reconstruction from above. Such a proletarian dictatorship
has never happened and never can happen, as follows from the premises of Marxism itself.
After setting out this theoretical framework, I consider its implications in practice. My focus here
is not on worker cooperatives, since I discuss those in other chapters of the book on which this
essay is based, but on things like municipal enterprise and participatory budgeting. I argue that
these may be the seeds of the new economy, the post-capitalist society that will germinate in the
next century or so. After reviewing a few of these initiatives, I conclude the essay by considering
why states and ruling classes will allow the “revolution” to happen despite its anti-capitalist
character. At certain points I draw parallels with the earlier transition in Western Europe from
feudalism to capitalism. I think that if we examine that earlier revolution carefully, we’ll find clues
as to how the future may unfold.

Theory
Marx has, in effect, two theories of revolution, one that applies only to the transition from
capitalism to socialism and another that is more transhistorical, applying, for instance, also to the
earlier transition between feudalism and capitalism. I will consider, and revise, each of these in
turn. Both see the working class as the agent of transition to a post-capitalist economy. Whatever
Marx meant by “working class,” in the following I will interpret the term broadly, as denoting the
majority of wage-earners—except those whose high income, high managerial positions, ownership
of stocks, and so on effectively align them with the capitalist rather than the working class. It has
long been known that many people in modern society, especially those in the “middle class,” have
contradictory class locations, sharing some interests with capitalists and others with low-wage
workers. This is what makes it possible for the middle class sometimes to act in radical ways and
other times in reactionary ways.8 Typically, in fact, the middle class has been the conservative
bastion of social order; nevertheless, the wage-earning status of most of its members always holds
out the possibility that someday they will act in radical opposition to those who own capital. If
they lose their middle-class status, whether through economic crisis or some other cause, this
possibility becomes more likely.
Among the people who will or can serve as the agents of transition to a new society are, for
example, industrial workers, clerical workers, low-wage service workers, a majority of teachers,
the unemployed, and in general those people who are relatively disempowered by corporate
capitalism or have grievances that can be remedied by a dismantling of capitalism. This category
of people in fact also includes others whom Marx might not consider working-class: most students,
peasants, dispossessed indigenous peoples, even environmental activists (for such activism is
really part of the class struggle, the struggle against the predatory capitalist class). All these people
and more, the totality of whom amounts to the large majority of humanity, have interests opposed
to the profit-making, environmentally destructive, humanly exploitative, universally
commodifying, undemocratic imperatives of corporate capital, and therefore are effectively the
8
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“workers of the world” whom Marx called to “unite.” This is how we should interpret his call in
the twenty-first century.
Let’s consider, then, the basics of his theory of how capitalism will gave way to socialism. The
pivot of the theory is capital’s unquenchable thirst for profit, for surplus-value. It seeks always to
squeeze more surplus-value out of the worker, which is to say value for which the worker does not
receive an equivalent in wages.9 This entails the reduction of wages to as low a level as possible
(given societal conditions, workers’ power, the skill-level of the job, etc.) and the intensification
of work to as high a level as possible. Capital invests its earnings in labor-saving, money-saving
schemes like mechanization, ever-increasing automation so as to employ fewer workers, especially
fewer skilled ones, control them more effectively, and generate more profit. At the same time, it
expands its operations and puts less profitable competitors out of business. These failed
competitors—who historically have included artisans, craftsmen, much of the petty-bourgeoisie,
and many capitalists themselves—are forced to become wage-earners as the relatively few
surviving capitalists acquire more money and power. Most of the peasantry, too, is eventually
forced off the land through myriad pressures of “push” and “pull,” swelling the ranks of the
working class. The “reserve army of the unemployed” also tends to grow, in part because periodic
economic crises throw people out of work and shutter unprofitable businesses. Without delving
into Marxian economics, we can say that these are typically crises of overproduction and/or
underconsumption, the latter a product of the endemic drive to lower wages and employ as few
workers as possible. That is to say, low aggregate demand leads to disincentives for business to
invest and incentives to cut costs, which means laying off workers and paying them less, thus
aggravating the macroeconomic problem.10 The end-result of all these tendencies, at least
according to Marx’s ideal model, is that the working class and the unemployed population become
larger and poorer, while the capitalist class gets smaller (at least relatively) and wealthier. Society
becomes increasingly divided into two polarized classes. Workers’ self-interest and collective
grievances impel them to fight together for their power and dignity: they form unions and other
associations, some of them political, that train them in struggle and radicalize them. Because their
demands can ultimately not be met in the framework of capitalism, at length they seek to take over
the state so as to remake the economy along democratic, i.e. socialist, lines. Marx thinks that
eventually they are destined to succeed, if only because of their overwhelming numbers and their
decades of organizing themselves.
To repeat, this is an ideal model and therefore, like all models, a simplification. The question is
how closely it resembles reality. The answer appears to be: in some respects very much so, in
This controversial theory of surplus-value is really nothing but common sense, like most of Marxism. If a worker’s
wages were equivalent to all the value he produces in the form of a product that goes on the market, the capitalist
couldn’t make any profit. He obtains a surplus value over and above what he pays for workers and equipment. On
Marxian economics, see, among innumerable others, Ernest Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory (London: The Merlin
Press, 1968); Paul Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development: Principles of Marxian Political Economy (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1942); and David Harvey, The Limits to Capital (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1982).
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others not. In particular, the analysis of how capitalism works seems clearly to be an accurate, if
idealized, model of definite tendencies in the real world. On the other hand, the prediction of
radicalization of the masses—their increasing class-consciousness—and eventual overthrow of the
capitalist state has not been fulfilled. Before considering these matters in greater depth, however,
I’ll describe Marx’s “second” theory of revolution, the transhistorical theory.
Its locus classicus is this passage from Marx’s Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy:
…At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come
into conflict with the existing relations of production or—this merely expresses the
same thing in legal terms—with the property relations within the framework of
which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive
forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution.
The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation
of the whole immense superstructure.
There are several problems with the theory as expressed here. First of all, it is clearly the barest of
outlines, desperately in need of elaboration. Unfortunately, nowhere in Marx’s writings does he
elaborate it in a rigorous way. Second, it is stated in functionalist terms. Revolution happens
supposedly because the productive forces—i.e., technology, scientific knowledge, labor-power
and labor skills, and technical methods of work organization—have advanced to such a point that
production relations are no longer compatible with their socially efficient use and development.
But what are the causal mechanisms that connect this functionalist concept of “fettering of the
productive forces” to social revolution? As far as I know, nowhere does Marx express his theory
in causal, as opposed to functionalist, terms.11
Perhaps the biggest problem is that, as it is stated above, the theory verges on meaninglessness.
How does one determine when production relations have started to impede the use and
development of productive forces? It would seem that to some extent they are always doing so. In
capitalism, for example, one could point to the following facts: (1) recurring recessions and
depressions periodically make useless much of society’s productive capacity; (2) enormous
amounts of resources are wasted on socially useless advertising and marketing campaigns; (3)
there is a lack of incentives for capital to invest in public goods like mass transit, the provision of
free education, and public parks; (4) the recent financialization of the Western economy has
entailed investment not in the development of infrastructure but in glorified gambling that scarcely
benefits society; (5) artificial obstacles such as intellectual copyright laws hinder the development
and diffusion of knowledge and technology; (6) a colossal level of expenditures is devoted to war
and destructive military technology; (7) in general, capitalism distributes resources in a profoundly
irrational way, such that, for example, hundreds of millions of people starve while a few become
multi-billionaires. Despite all this, however, no successful revolution has happened.
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Indeed, in other respects capitalism continues to develop productive forces in a striking way, as
shown by recent momentous advances in information technology. It’s true that—contrary to the
fantasies of “free market” enthusiasts—this technology was originally developed in the state
sector;12 nevertheless, the broader economic and social context was and is that of capitalism. It is
clear, therefore, that a mode of production can “fetter” and “develop” productive forces at the same
time, a fact Marx didn’t acknowledge.
In order to salvage his hypothesis quoted above, and in fact to make it quite useful, a subtle revision
is necessary. We have to replace his idea of a conflict between productive forces and production
relations with that of a conflict between two sets of production relations, one of which uses
productive forces in a more rational and “un-fettering” way than the other. This change, slight as
it might seem, has major consequences for the Marxist theory of revolution. It is no exaggeration
to say that, in addition to making the theory logically and empirically cogent, it changes its entire
orientation, from advocating a “dictatorship of the proletariat” that plans social and economic
reconstruction to advocating a semi-grassroots, long-term evolution of social movements that
remake the economy and society from the ground up (albeit with the crucial aid of incremental
changes in state policy). I will also argue that my revision makes the theory finally compatible
with the basic premises of Marxism itself, and that a statist version of Marxism, such as Leninism,
is un-Marxist, idealistic, and unrealistic.
My revision to the theory, then, is simply that at certain moments in history, new forces and
relations of production evolve in an older economic and social framework, undermining it from
within. For different reasons in different cases, the new production relations spread throughout the
society, gradually overturning the traditional economic, social, political, and cultural relations,
until a more or less new social system has evolved. This happened, for example, with the Neolithic
Revolution (or Agricultural Revolution), which started around 12,000 years ago. As knowledge
and techniques of agriculture developed that made possible sedentary populations, the huntergatherer mode of production withered away, as did the ways of life appropriate to it.
Likewise, starting around the thirteenth century in parts of Europe, an economy and society
organized around manorialism and feudalism began to succumb to an economy centered around
the accumulation of capital. Several factors contributed to this process, among them (1) the revival
of long-distance trade (after centuries of Europe’s relative isolation from the rest of the world),
which stimulated the growth of merchant capitalism in the urban interstices of the feudal order;
(2) mercantile support for the growth of the nation-state with a strong central authority that could
dismantle feudal restrictions to trade and integrated markets; (3) the rise, particularly in England,
of a class of agrarian capitalists who took advantage of new national and international markets
(e.g., for wool) by investing in improved cultivation methods and enclosing formerly communal
lands to use them for pasturage; (4) the partly resultant migration of masses of the peasantry to
cities, where, during the centuries from the sixteenth to the nineteenth, they added greatly to the
class of laborers who could be used in manufacturing; (5) the discovery of the Americas, which
further stimulated commerce and the accumulation of wealth. In short, from the thirteenth to the
nineteenth centuries, capitalist classes—mercantile, financial, agrarian, and industrial—emerged
in Europe, aided by technological innovations such as the printing press and then, later on, by all
12
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the technologies that were made possible by the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century.
All this is just to say that in the womb of the old society, new productive forces and production
relations evolved that were more dynamic and wealth-generating than earlier ones. Moreover, on
the foundation of these new technologies, economic relations, and scientific discourses arose new
social, political, and cultural relations and ideologies that were propagated by the most dynamic
groups with the most resources, i.e., the bourgeoisie and its intellectual hangers-on.13
It is true that numerous political clashes had to occur before the rising bourgeoisie could achieve
hegemony over Europe. Both the feudal aristocracy and absolutist monarchies opposed the
bourgeois doctrines of economic and political liberalism, such that a series of revolutions was
necessary before the bourgeoisie could accede to political power. The point relevant to the
following discussion is that once capitalist economic relations had reached a relatively mature and
widespread level—aided, significantly, by a “non-capitalist” absolutist state—the ultimate
political victories of the capitalist class were inevitable, if only because of this class’s continuing
growth and access to more resources than its opponents had. Even more pertinently, it was only
when capitalist economic relations had already made significant progress that bourgeois political
revolutions were possible.14
We should apply the lessons of the transition from feudalism to capitalism to the future transition
from capitalism to post-capitalism. This, too, will have to happen in a very gradual way, as new
production relations sprout (initially) in the “interstices” of a decaying order. Briefly stated, one
can expect that capitalism’s descent into long-term crisis (or stagnation) will generate—or rather,
is generating—movements of resistance across the world, many of which will be devoted to
establishing new cooperative modes of production and distribution that will assist millions of the
unemployed and the cast-off in their tasks of survival. Explicitly political anti-capitalist resistance
will spread too, but it cannot possibly attain the summits of political power without having
command over tremendous resources, sufficient resources to compete against the ruling class. An
important way of acquiring such resources is by accumulating capital through business activities,
such as cooperatives and some other “solidarity economy” institutions do. Thus, just as the
bourgeoisie could not achieve power before the capitalist economy had made inroads across
Europe, so the working class cannot take over political power on a broad scale before its own
economic institutions, its “socialist” institutions, have partially remade the world economy. Sooner
or later, durable alliances will have to be made between the solidarity economy and political
movements if the latter are to succeed in their ultimate objectives. On a global level this process
can be expected to take at least a century or two.
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Before examining these ideas in more detail, it is worth reviewing the advantages of the revision
I’ve made to Marx’s theory of revolution. Again, my argument is just that social revolution
happens when an old set of production relations fetters—or irrationally uses—productive forces
in relation to a new set of widely emerging production relations. The “in relation to…” that I have
added saves the theory from meaninglessness, for it indicates a definite point at which the “old”
society really begins to yield to the “new” one, namely when an emergent economy has evolved
to the point that it commands substantial resources, is highly visible, and is clearly more
systemically “rational” than the old economy. Whether this hypothesis applies to all social
revolutions is a question I won’t consider; the point is that it does apply to some, and it will surely
apply to any transition between capitalism and cooperativism.
Another advantage of my revision is that it supplies a causal mechanism by which a particular
mode of production’s “fettering of the productive forces” leads to revolution—indeed, to
successful revolution. The mechanism is that the emergent mode of production, in being less
dysfunctional and/or more “efficient” than the dominant mode, eventually (after reaching a certain
visibility) attracts vast numbers of adherents who participate in it and propagandize for it—
especially if the social context is one of general economic stagnation and class polarization, due
to the dominant mode of production’s dysfunctionality. Moreover, this latter fact means that, after
a long evolution, the emergent economic relations and their institutional partisans will have access
to so many resources that they will be able to triumph economically and politically over the
reactionary partisans of the old, deteriorating economy. Again, this is what ultimately ensured the
political success of the bourgeoisie in its confrontations with the feudal aristocracy. Similarly, if
capitalism continues to stagnate and experience manifold crises, this will ensure the global victory
of a cooperative mode of production that will have developed over generations in the interstices
of capitalist society.
In short, my revision provides a necessary condition for the success of an anti-capitalist revolution,
and thus, as we’ll see in a moment, helps answer the old question of why no anti-capitalist
revolution so far has been successful in the long term (namely because the condition has been
absent). Another way of seeing the implications and advantages of the revision is by contrasting it
with the views of orthodox Marxists. A single sentence from Friedrich Engels sums up these views:
“The proletariat seizes state power, and then transforms the means of production into state
property.”15 This statement, approved by Lenin and apparently also by Marx, encapsulates the
mistaken statist perspective of the orthodox Marxist conception of proletarian revolution. This
perspective is briefly described in the Communist Manifesto, where Marx writes “The proletariat
will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize
all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling
class,” and then lays out a ten-point plan of social reconstruction by means of state decrees. By the
1870s Marx had abandoned the specifics of his earlier plan, but his statism remained, and
transmitted itself to his followers.16 It’s true that orthodox Marxists expect the state, “as a state,”
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to somehow wither away eventually, but they do have a statist point of view in relation to the early
stages of revolution.
This statist vision emerges naturally from both of Marx’s theories of revolution discussed above:
from the first one, because Marx simply assumes that the only way to make a socialist revolution
is to, first, completely take over the national government; from the second, because the idea of a
conflict between the rational use and development of productive forces and the fettering nature of
current production relations suggests that at some point a social “explosion” will occur whereby
the productive forces are finally liberated from the chains of the irrational mode of production.
Pressure builds up, so to speak, over many years, as the mode of production keeps fettering the
socially rational use of technology and scientific knowledge; through the agency of the working
class, the productive forces struggle against the shackles of economic relations; at length they burst
free, when the working class takes over the state and reorganizes the economy. These are the
metaphors naturally conjured by the passage quoted above from the Preface to A Contribution to
the Critique of Political Economy.
But there are logical and empirical problems with this statist view that has dominated Marxist
thinking, the view according to which the substance of social revolution occurs after the seizure
of state power. First of all, it is in tension with the Marxian conception of social dynamics. Briefly
stated, Marx sees the economy—rightly—as the relative foundation of the rest of society, including
the political sphere, which suggests that a post-capitalist social revolution cannot be politically
willed and imposed. This would seem to reverse the order of “dominant causality,” from politics
to the economy rather than vice versa. Moreover, such extreme statism exalts will as determining
human affairs, a notion that is quite incompatible with the dialectical spirit of Marxism. History
really happens “behind the backs” of actors: it evolves “unconsciously,” so to speak, as Hegel
understood. Social and institutional conflicts work themselves out, slowly, through the actions of
large numbers of people who generally have little idea of the true historical significance of their
acts. As Marx said, we should rarely put credence in the self-interpretations of historical actors
(because they are constrained and influenced by objective institutional realities of which they’re
little aware or which they interpret incorrectly).17 And yet he apparently suspends this injunction,
and his whole dialectical method, when it comes to the so-called proletarian revolution. These
historical actors are somehow supposed to have perfect understanding of themselves and their
place in history, and their historical designs are supposed to work out perfectly and
straightforwardly—despite the massive complexity and “dialectical contradictions” of society.
The reality is that if “the working class” or its ostensible representatives seize control of the state
in a predominantly capitalist society—and if, miraculously, they aren’t crushed by the forces of
reaction—they can expect to face overwhelming obstacles to the realization of their revolutionary
plans. Some of these obstacles are straightforward: for example, divisions among the new ruling
elite, divisions within the working class itself, popular resistance to plans to remake the economy,
the necessity for brutal authoritarian methods of rule in order to force people to accept the new
government’s plans, the inevitable creation of a large bureaucracy to carry out so-called
reconstruction, etc. Fundamental to all these obstacles is the fact that, in this scenario, the
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revolutionaries have to contend with the institutional legacies of capitalism: relations of coercion
and domination condition everything the government does, and there is no way to break free of
them. They cannot be magically transcended through political will. In particular, it is impossible
through top-down directives to transform production relations from authoritarian to democratic;
Marxism itself would seem to suggest that the state is not socially creative in this radical way. The
hope to reorganize exploitative relations of production into emancipatory, democratic relations by
means of bureaucracy and the exercise of a unitary political will—the “proletarian dictatorship”—
is utterly utopian, idealistic, and un-Marxist.
The record of so-called Communist revolutions in the twentieth century is instructive. While one
can expect some Marxists to deny that lessons should be drawn from these revolutions, since they
happened in relatively “primitive” rather than advanced capitalist countries, the experiences are at
least suggestive. For what they created in their respective societies was not socialism (popular
democratic control of the economy) or communism (a classless, stateless, moneyless society of
anarchistic democracy) but a kind of ultra-statist state capitalism. To quote the economist Richard
Wolff, “the internal organization of the vast majority of industrial enterprises [in Communist
countries] remained capitalist. The productive workers continued in all cases to produce surpluses:
they added more in value by their labor than what they received in return for that labor. Their
surpluses were in all cases appropriated and distributed by others.”18 Workers continued to be
exploited and oppressed, as in capitalism; the accumulation of capital continued to be the
overriding systemic imperative, to which human needs were subordinated. While there are specific
historical reasons for the way these economies developed, the general underlying condition was
that it was and is impossible to transcend the capitalist framework if the political revolution takes
place in a capitalist world, ultimately because the economy dominates politics more than political
will can dominate the economy.
In any case, it was and is breathtakingly utopian to think that an attempted seizing of the state in
an advanced and still overwhelmingly capitalist country, however crisis-ridden its economy, could
ever succeed, because the ruling class has a virtual monopoly over the most sophisticated and
destructive means of violence available in the world. Even rebellions in relatively peripheral
countries have almost always been crushed, first because the ruling classes there had
disproportionate access to means of violence, and second because the ruling classes in more
advanced countries could send their even more sophisticated instruments of warfare to these
countries in order to put down the revolution. But if a massive insurrection—or even an electorally
grounded left-wing takeover of the state—happened in one of the core capitalist nations, as
opposed to a peripheral one, the reaction of ruling classes worldwide would be nearly apocalyptic.
They would likely prefer the nuclear destruction of civilization to permitting the working class or
some radical subsection of it to completely take over a central capitalist state and dismantle big
business.
My revision of Marx’s theory of revolution avoids all these problems while still retaining key
insights about the inevitable causes of revolution. It is obvious that any transition to a new society,
if carried out largely through the agency of the oppressed masses (which it will have to be), will
be a consequence of capitalism’s socially irrational distribution of resources and fettering of the
productive and democratic potential of current “forces of production.” If used sensibly, there is no
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question that modern wealth, technology, and scientific know-how could make possible adequate
shelter, sustenance, and security for billions more people than currently enjoy them. An anticapitalist revolution will be motivated by the imperative to redress these (and other) inequalities
and injustices, and it will necessarily take the form of instituting new, more democratic property
and production relations. Whether such a revolution is “inevitable,” as Marx and Engels seem to
have believed, is a question I will consider later. I will also consider the reasons why the state and
the ruling class will allow a revolution of the “gradual” sort I have described to happen. The point
is that the only possible way—and the only Marxist way—for a transition out of capitalism to
occur is that it be grounded in, and organized on the basis of, the new, gradually and widely
emerging production relations themselves. This is the condition that has been absent in all attempts
at revolution so far, and it explains why, aside from a few isolated pockets of momentary socialism
(such as Catalonia in 1936), they never managed to transcend a kind of state capitalism. They
existed in a capitalist world, so they were constrained by the institutional limits of that world.
Ironically, Marx understood that this would be the case unless the revolution was international. He
understood that “socialism in one country” is impossible. He knew that unless an insurrection in,
say, Russia triggered or coincided with insurrections elsewhere, which on an international scale
worked together, so to speak, to build a socialist mode of production, it was doomed to failure.
What he didn’t understand was that the only way a revolution can be international is that it happen
in a similar way to the centuries-long “capitalist revolution” in Europe and North America, namely
by sprouting on the local level, the municipal level, the regional level, and expanding on that
“grassroots” basis—while aided, to be sure, by progressive changes in state policy. The hope that
the states and ruling classes of many nations can fall at approximately the same time to a succession
of national uprisings (whether electoral or not)—which is the only way that Marx’s conception of
revolution can come to pass—is wildly unrealistic, again because of the nature of capitalist power
dynamics that Marxism itself clarifies.
Indeed, only recently has capitalism attained the truly globalized condition that Marx assumed was
a necessary prerequisite for revolution. While there are good reasons to say that the USSR and
Communist China before the 1980s or 1990s were in some respects state capitalist, their
“capitalism” was very different from the competitive, market-driven system that is impelled by
economic logic to expand and spread its dominion over the planet. This capitalism, which Wolff
calls “private [as opposed to state] capitalism,” has only in the last forty years spread to huge areas
of the world that had for a long time managed to hold it at bay. In addition to China, the USSR,
and Eastern Europe, much of Latin America and Africa until the 1990s remained outside the
domain of capitalist relations of production, defined by the presence of a mass of people who own
nothing but their labor-power and are consequently forced to seek employment with those who
own the means of production. The absence of these production relations was the result of many
factors, for instance popular and elite reactions against the predatory liberal capitalism and
imperialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.19 In other cases, such as parts of
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Central America, it was the result of international capitalism’s shoring up domestic semi-serfdom,
by means of the peculiar incentive structures created by “merchant capitalism” and the
international division of labor (whereby some countries export raw materials, others export
finished products).20 Finally by the 1980s and 1990s, all this semi-capitalism, semi-feudalism,
peasant resistance to proletarianization, state ownership of industries, and so on gave way to
neoliberal offensives of privatization and marketization, such that the capitalist mode of production
and its corresponding property relations have by now virtually conquered the world and are
creating a truly global “proletariat” (or “precariat”). As they do so, resistance spreads and
intensifies.
In order to understand what is likely to happen in the next fifty and a hundred years, it is useful to
contextualize the historical moment we’re living in. And to properly understand its context, it helps
to resurrect an old, currently unfashionable idea, viz., that there is a kind of logic to history. That
is, we should return to Marx’s Hegelian notion that history, on the broadest scale, unfolds
according to a certain semi-“necessity,” which is always evident in retrospect. This idea is
commonly rejected nowadays, even by leftists, for two main reasons: first, it seems to deny that
individuals have the power to shape history, that they are active agents in the historical process,
instead treating them as mere tools of an impersonal historical “Reason”; second, it seems to
valorize this Reason as being synonymous with “Progress” in some quasi-moral sense, implying
(supposedly) that, e.g., the rise of Europe in modern times was both inevitable and good, and that
people who resisted such things as industrial capitalism were benighted and backward, the enemies
of progress.21 The result of these misinterpretations is that few writers now are interested in
excavating the structural tendencies, the dialectical self-undermining, the logic of “the emergence
of the new within the shell of the old” by which historical phases have yielded to their successors.
Radical authors like Richard Wolff, David Schweickart, and Michael Albert have largely
abandoned Marx’s quasi-“scientific” conception of socialism, according to which socialism not
only should but will happen (by means of class struggle); their approaches to the subject are not
so much historical as ethical. We should resurrect Marx’s historical approach—which follows
Hegel’s in seeing the “truth,” the “meaning,” of the past as revealed by the present and future—in
the process correcting his mistakes.22
Consider Marx’s predictions that the impoverished working class would continue to expand until
it constituted the majority of society, and that as it did so its class consciousness and radicalism
would mature—internationally—to the point that world revolution would occur. In retrospect, we
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can see that he was wrong; he misunderstood capitalist society. While there are indeed tendencies
toward class polarization, impoverishment of workers, international class solidarity, and economic
crisis, there are also tendencies toward assimilation of the working class into the dominant order,
toward “pure and simple trade-unionism,” toward the state’s stabilizing management of the
economy, and toward workers’ identification not only with the abstract notion of a social class that
spans continents but also with the more concrete facts of ethnicity, race, occupation, immediate
community, and nation. These identifications make possible the working class’s fragmentation,
which diminishes the likelihood of socialist revolution in the classical sense. Similarly, the
historical successes of unionism obviated the necessity (from the proletariat’s perspective) of
revolution; reform was sufficient, at least in the short term, to improve the life situations of a large
proportion of workers. Thus was born twentieth-century social democracy and collective
bargaining.
Marx was right that the capitalist class is averse to progressive initiatives like these, and that it has
inordinate influence over the state; what he didn’t appreciate was the historic potential of divisions
within the class. The research of Thomas Ferguson, for example, has shown that the “second New
Deal” (in 1935) in the United States, which led to the welfare state and federal protection of
collective bargaining, was made possible by divisions in capitalist ranks between labor-intensive,
domestically oriented, protectionist businesses, such as those in the textile industry, and capitalintensive, internationally oriented businesses, such as Standard Oil and General Electric. The
former were viciously opposed to labor-empowering measures like the 1935 Wagner Act, while
the latter, who valued social stability more than savage repression of workers, in fact helped write
the Wagner and Social Security Acts.23 Their support for Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the New
Deal order made the U.S. welfare state possible (as did, in another sense, the struggles of millions
of workers). The welfare state—and the institutionalization of collective bargaining—in turn
contributed to postwar economic and political stability, which for a while seemed to invalidate
Marx’s pessimistic analysis of capitalism. Unions became part of the “establishment”; much of the
white working class became increasingly conservative, alienated from movements for radical
social change, and intellectuals decided that Marx had been totally wrong all along.
In reality, though, what he was wrong about was the timeline, as I said earlier. It was impossible
for capitalism to succumb to socialism in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries. Suppose, for
instance, that by some unimaginable miracle Friedrich Engels’ eager prophecies (in the 1880s)
with regard to the American union the Knights of Labor had been borne out. Aware of its
experiments in cooperativism, its attempts at industrial unionism, and its radical rhetoric, Engels
predicted it would serve as midwife of a revolutionary class consciousness and class organization
that would lead the workers to victory over capitalism. This couldn’t have happened, of course,
for obvious reasons. (The ruling class had a monopoly over the means of violence; the courts,
ultra-reactionary, erected every conceivable obstacle to the advance of organized labor;24 divisions
in the working class, between black and white, skilled and unskilled, immigrant and nonimmigrant, precluded the necessary continent-wide unity.) But suppose capitalism had been
overthrown in the United States in the late 1880s or 1890s and a semi-cooperative “republic of
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labor” had been founded, with artisans in their small workshops connected through cooperative
networks, public control of industry, consumer cooperatives proliferating around the nation. What
would have happened then? Capitalists in Europe would have continued amassing profit, investing
in mechanization, building up industry and technology, and the artisans, craftsmen, and selfgoverning industrial workers in the U.S. would have been, in the long run, unable to compete with
them. In the end, the U.S.’s proto-socialism would have eroded due to competition from Europe,
and a degeneration to capitalism would have taken place, much as it did later in the Soviet Union.
What this would have proven is that America’s proto-socialist adventure, like the USSR’s socalled “state socialism,” was a historical detour, a kind of accident.
Economic conditions—and productive forces—simply were not “ripe” then, or in the twentieth
century, for international socialism. It is appalling to contemplate the irony of this fact. It’s an
absurd, senseless tragedy: millions of people in the Americas, in Russia and China, in Germany,
in France, in Spain and Italy and dozens more countries spending decades fighting and dying for
a dream that would never have come to fruition anyway because, supposing they had achieved
something like it in a particular region, such as Catalonia, and it had not been crushed by the forces
of reaction, it would have slowly degenerated under market pressures from the broader capitalist
society, pressures on wages—downward for the lower workers, upward for the higher—pressures
to automate, and the business cycles that inevitably would have seeped in to these havens of
cooperation and disturbed the order of things, and of course after the revolutionary fervor had
subsided the usual daily problems of running factories would have cropped up, “alienation” would
have returned because industrial work is inherently unpleasant, battles between management and
the average worker would have spoiled the revolution. Mondragon’s recent history confirms these
counterfactual claims. So, the irony is shockingly cruel: it is when capitalist industrialization was
starting, precisely when socialism was least possible, that workers, artisans, peasants, and
intellectuals fought with greatest heroism and determination for socialism. Industrialization was
so brutal and so conducive to the lower classes’ radicalization that visions of, and struggles for, a
cooperative society were inevitable everywhere. But they did not have the significance their
participants thought they did. They were, so to speak, symptoms of the birth-pangs of industrial
capitalism, not of its death-throes. Or, to view the matter from a different perspective, they were—
in the long run—symptoms of the (brutal, conflict-ridden) maturation and consolidation of the
nation-state, not of the imminent overcoming of capitalism. A global system structured around
state-capitalist nation-states was always the inevitable outcome, despite the utopian hopes of
millions of oppressed people.
This, indeed, is another way of expressing Marx’s mistake: political conditions were not ripe for
international socialist revolution. Marx didn’t foresee the “mature nation-state” period of history,
which is to say the twentieth century. He profoundly underestimated the power of the “nationality”
principle, and of the state. In many ways he was right that the class principle is more important
than the nation principle, but not in the way he wanted: business tended to be more loyal to class
than to the nation, and it used the idea of nationality to divide the working class and maintain social
control. (For example, big business subsidized and continues to subsidize fascist or proto-fascist
movements because they distract from the class struggle and serve business’s political agendas;
and its frequent support for “patriotic” wars is a function not only of their profit-making potential
but also of their usefulness in stifling domestic social discontent and progressive political

movements.25) For other reasons too, though, the nation-state’s central authority was bound to get
stronger, more thickly bureaucratic, more extensive, more “society-regulating,” more effective at
manufacturing consent, than it was in, say, the 1870s. In retrospect we can see this. From the
Middle Ages on, capitalism and the nation-state have grown up together in a symbiotic relationship
(at least until very recently); it was inevitable that as capitalism continued to grow in power and
extent in the early and middle twentieth century, the nation-state would do so as well.26
There isn’t space here to discuss all the reasons for the necessary failure of Marx’s prophecies in
the historical short term, or for the inevitability of the “high modernist” period of the nation-state.27
I could, for instance, draw from the Marxian tradition itself and argue that an era of “monopoly
capital” necessarily followed the nineteenth-century era of competitive capitalism, and that
monopoly capitalism necessarily engendered certain varieties of state capitalism, corporatism,
fascism, welfare-statism, etc.28 Instead I’ll invoke Karl Polanyi’s arguments in The Great
Transformation, while adding my own perspective, which brings the story up to the neoliberalism
of the present day. Permit me to quote from my Notes of an Underground Humanist:
It’s always dangerous to construct abstract schemas, but there appear to
have been two, or rather one-and-a-half, “cycles” in capitalist history. Abstractly
you can think of it in this way: first, a lot of ancient [feudal] communal practices
and public goods [such as the peasant commons] were dismantled before, during,
and after the Industrial Revolution. You can call this the first wave of privatization.
(It has continued unceasingly all over the world, but let’s just call it the first wave.)
As it was going on, the victims of capitalism sought to maintain their old rights
and/or acquire new, governmentally protected ones. At length they succeeded to
some extent, and new public goods were consolidated under the 20th-century
Keynesian welfare state. This was probably a nearly inevitable development,
because, as Karl Polanyi argued in The Great Transformation, marketization and
privatization will, if unchecked, eventually cause the total destruction of society.
So popular resistance, aided by sane elements of the upper classes, succeeded in
regulating further depredations and temporarily saving society after the Great
Depression. But technology kept progressing, capital mobility increased, global
integration continued, populations kept growing, and the politicized and “public”
nature of the Keynesian state started encroaching too much on capitalist class
power. Finally the masses got out of hand, got too politicized, too powerful—all
those crazy ideas of democracy in the 1960s!—and there was a capitalist backlash,
made possible by (and making possible) ever-more-globally-integrated markets,
elite institutional networks, and extreme capital mobility worldwide. The
inflationary consequences of relative popular empowerment in a context of
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economic stagnation (the 1970s) were tamed, namely by destroying popular
empowerment. That is, the second wave of privatization occurred, after the 1970s:
public goods were again dismantled and “capital accumulation by dispossession”
began anew (though, in truth, it had never really stopped). This time, the old
nationalist Keynesian solution to the horrors of privatization wasn’t available, since
the world had become too integrated and nations themselves were deteriorating,
due to the post-1970s capitalist onslaught. So transnational social movements were
necessary…29
Or, even more schematically:
With respect to the very long run, Marx was always right that capitalism is
not sustainable. There are many reasons for this, including the contradiction
between a system that requires infinite growth and a natural environment that is
finite, but the reason most relevant to Marxism is that ultimately capital can never
stop accumulating power at the expense of every other force in society. It is
insatiable; its [competition-driven] lust for ever more profit and power condemns
it to a life of Faustian discontent. It can never rest. Any accommodations, therefore,
between the wage-earning class and capital—such accommodations as the welfare
state and the legitimization of collective bargaining—are bound to be temporary.
Sooner or later capital’s aggressiveness will overpower contrary trends and
consume everything, like a societal black hole (to change the metaphor). Everything
is sucked into the vortex, including social welfare, the nation-state, even nature
itself. The logic is that nothing will remain but The Corporation [in the plural], and
government protections of the people will be dismantled because such protections
are not in the interest of capital. This absurd, totalitarian logic can never reach its
theoretical culmination, but it will, it must, proceed far enough, eventually, that an
apocalyptic struggle between the masses and capital ensues. A relatively mild
version of this happened once before, in the 1930s and ’40s, and a compromise [in
the West]—the mature welfare state—was the result. But then, as I said, capital
repudiated the compromise (or is doing so as I write these words), and the old trends
Marx diagnosed returned with a vengeance, and so humanity could look forward,
this time, to a final reckoning. A final settling of accounts will occur in the coming
century or so.30
Those two paragraphs sum up my argument as to the context in which the new “alternative
economy” of cooperatives and other anti-capitalist institutions is arising. The rise of neoliberalism
(from the mid-1970s on) was inevitable, given the distribution of power in the West and the
heightening of international economic competition after the 1960s.31 In other words, a resurgence
of global privatization and capitalist empowerment—after the consummation of the nation-state
era between the 1930s and 1960s—was bound to happen, which means that social disintegration
and atomization was bound to reach the pathological extremes of the present. This was destined,
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sooner or later, to trigger massive resistance and creative efforts to reconstruct civil society and
the economy on a new basis. These efforts are still in their infancy.
To elaborate in a little more detail: As David Harvey and others have argued, the corporate
capitalist class in the U.S. and Britain faced two major problems in the mid-1970s. First, it had to
rein in the 1960s’ “excess of democracy” that was threatening its political power;32 second, it had
to restore its profits that were eroding from the combination of intense international competition
and “excessively generous” social welfare programs. Moreover, these programs, and in general all
the pressures resulting from the population’s relative political empowerment, were contributing to
high inflation, which was bound to become intolerable to much of the ruling class sooner or later.
In the end, the most effective way to curb inflation and to protect profits from the demands of
organized labor was, first, to adopt a restrictive monetary policy (which Paul Volcker, chairman
of the Federal Reserve, did in 1979) and, second, to dismantle the welfare, regulatory, and laboraccommodating regime that had been constructed between the 1930s and early 1970s.33 The
Reagan and Thatcher administrations proceeded to do this with gusto in the 1980s, and their
successor administrations in the 1990s and 2000s continued their work. In the U.S., for example,
union density in the private sector sank from 35 percent in 1954, and 20 percent in 1980, to less
than 7 percent today. Various “free trade” acts, such as NAFTA, have been negotiated that have
contributed to the decimation of organized labor in the affected countries. Daily newspaper
headlines remind us of the devastation of the social safety net. Numerous studies have described
how government regulation of the economy has been gutted since the 1970s, making possible the
financial collapse and recession of 2008 and 2009. All this grows out of the dynamics of a
corporate capitalism that is throwing off the shackles imposed on it by the nation-state-centric
“compromise” (between labor and capital) of the postwar period.34
Moreover, by now the political economy of neoliberalism has spread from the U.S. and U.K. to
the whole world. Libraries could be filled with the scholarship and popular writings on this subject.
Naomi Klein provides a good popular overview in The Shock Doctrine (2007), which recounts the
sordid tale of neoliberalism’s conquest of Latin America, Eastern Europe and Russia, Southeast
Asia, and the Middle East (leaving out Europe, Africa, China, and India). Through IMF structural
adjustment programs, trade agreements, collaboration with authoritarian governments, and other
means, the U.S. has imposed its model of a liberalized economy on the entire globe. Recently even
Europe, long known for its generous social welfare provisions and healthy trade-union presence,
has been shredding its former social contract. This process was underway long before the 2008
recession, but since then ruling elites have adopted the motto “Never let a crisis go to waste” and
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accelerated their dismantling of unions and the welfare state. The pretext, as always, is the
restoration of fiscal health and national economic competitiveness. The consequences are that far
fewer workers are covered by collective bargaining agreements, workplace protections are being
rolled back, income inequality is rising, healthcare and education are being partly privatized, and,
in general, the social fabric is being re-cut to fit the pattern of the U.S.35
The most important points about this worldwide hegemony of neoliberalism (and its associated
productive forces, in particular information technology36) are that it is causing a resurgence of
economic crisis and stagnation, and it is hollowing out the nation-state as an entity. Let’s consider
each of these phenomena in turn, starting with the first (which contributes to the second).
Any thoughtful observer of the neoliberal political economy has to be struck by the parallels
between it and the era that culminated in the Great Depression. There is similar class polarization
and vicious subjection of labor to capital, similar ‘thinness’ of government economic regulation,
similar extreme subordination of government to corporate capital, similar proneness to periodic
economic crisis, similar empowerment of financial capital, and so on.37 It’s true that there are
differences. For example, since the 1960s, deindustrialization has occurred in the West, most
notably in the United States. There, employment in the manufacturing sector declined as a share
of total non-farm employment from 31 percent in 1950 to 20.7 percent in 1980, 13.1 percent in
2000, and 9.1 percent in 2009.38 As Robert Brenner argues, this trend results in large part from
heightened international competition since the late 1960s and consequent declines in the growthrates of manufacturing profitability and investment.39 That is, intense international (and intranational) competition and the resultant diminished growth of profitability have necessitated firms’
feverish cost-cutting, which has meant more automation, employee layoffs, wage cuts, and
outsourcing of production. The former industrial infrastructure of the West has been dismantled as
firms have downsized and relocated their operations to regions with cheaper labor. In the process,
industrial unionism has been destroyed, the high wages and stable jobs of what was once the core
of the economy have become low wages and unstable (or nonexistent) jobs—in part because
automation is making human labor superfluous—and a massive restructuring of the West’s
economy has happened.
The existence of deindustrialization only supports the broader point I want to make, that (to quote
David Harvey) an “underlying problem [of] excessive capitalist empowerment vis-à-vis labour
and consequent wage repression, leading to problems of effective demand,”40 characterizes the
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dynamics of both neoliberalism and the political economy that eventuated in the Great Depression,
which is commonly interpreted along Keynesian lines, as a product of (among other things) low
aggregate demand. Deindustrialization has recently been a major contributor to this dynamic, and
thus to the stagnation that afflicts the West and with it much of the world. For the loss of jobs and
high wages in the manufacturing sector has not been compensated by high wages or a sufficient
quantity of stable jobs in the service sector; hence, in part, the higher income inequality in the West
now than fifty years ago, and the resultant lowering of aggregate demand.41
Moreover, with deindustrialization, increased capital mobility since the 1960s, the demise of the
Bretton Woods international regulatory framework in the 1970s, and in general the neoliberal
“restoration” of capitalist class power has come a financialization of the U.S. economy even more
striking than that of the late 1920s. It isn’t necessary to dwell on this point, since it has been
analyzed by scores of commentators.42 I will only note that the financial sector’s share of corporate
profits in the early 2000s was around 40 percent, though since then it has declined to 30 percent.43
Likewise, its share of GDP was 8.4 percent in 2011, compared to 2.8 percent in 1950. 44 As
investment has shifted from the “real” economy to the more profitable financial sector since the
1970s—a sector that employs far fewer people than manufacturing once did—wealth and income
inequality have skyrocketed, growth has stagnated, economic instability driven by speculative
bubbles has increased, physical and social infrastructure has deteriorated, and unemployment has
grown. Neoliberalism has meant, in short, a partial “de-development” of the United States (which
in this respect is not alone among advanced industrial countries).
Processes that were in some ways similarly disempowering to the majority of wage-earners helped
lead to the Great Depression, from which, as we know, ultimately emerged the Keynesian
compromise between capital and labor. The national state stepped in to boost aggregate demand
and empower labor, so keeping the system running. At the same time, nationalism, or rather the
“imagined community” of the nation, continued its earlier function as a kind of ideological glue to
cohere societies and ensure order: “we,” both capitalists and workers, were “Americans” (or
“British,” or “French,” or whatever) sharing a common language, a culture, a history, etc.45 “We”
were supposed to maintain allegiance to the nation and the state, i.e., to overarching powerstructures, no matter how much we might disagree with one another or want a bigger slice of the
economic pie than we had. To be “disloyal” was the supreme crime, and invoking that concept
proved effective as a way to tar and feather “radicals.” To call them Communists, for example,
was to call them foreigners and subversives, which marginalized them and helped keep the
capitalist order relatively stable. Thus the nation-statist compromise, which functioned

The business press sometimes has good coverage of these “underconsumptionist” trends. See, for example, Steve
Johnson, “Capital gobbles labour’s share, but victory is empty,” Financial Times, October 13, 2013.
42
In addition to works cited above, see Andrew Glyn, Capitalism Unleashed: Finance, Globalization, and Welfare
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); and, for the international context, Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital:
A History of the International Monetary System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
43
Jordan Weissmann, “How Wall Street Devoured Corporate America,” The Atlantic, March 5, 2013.
44
Justin Lahart, “Number of the Week: Finance’s Share of Economy Continues to Grow,” Real Time Economics
(blog), Wall Street Journal, December 10, 2011, http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2011/12/10/number-of-the-weekfinances-share-of-economy-continues-to-grow/ (accessed June 1, 2013).
45
See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York:
Verso, 2006).
41

ideologically as a kind of distraction (from immediate issues of economic, social, and political
empowerment), reached its classical, high modernist phase.
Since the 1970s, however, the nation-state, after many centuries of growing in power, importance,
and global extent, has finally begun its long, tortured descent into crisis and collapse. The elegant
irony of history is again on display: while the evolution of capitalism hitherto had contributed to
the consolidation of the nation-state, at this point capital outgrew and started to shake off its old
friend and enabler, which clung to it in ever more servile fashion. The state now does almost
whatever it has to to stay in the good graces of the most mobile and wealthy sector of capital,
finance; but other sectors, too, have found that they have a freer hand than they once did.
Again, the essential condition of this shift in the balance of power has been the spectacular increase
in capital mobility since the 1960s, made possible by the rise of new productive forces, in particular
electronic technology. Actually, even apart from its enabling the ascendancy of transnational
corporations and global finance, this technology is playing an important role in the downfall of the
nation. Just as “print-capitalism” after the fifteenth century contributed to the rise of the nationstate (as Benedict Anderson argues), what one might call “electronic capitalism” is contributing to
its fall. To be sure, the imagined community of the nation is declining faster than the national state
itself. The community is fragmented by electronic media, which, at least in the context of
capitalism, tend to substitute isolation and self-involvement for direct interaction with others, as
well as to degrade communication into instantaneous visual and auditory stimuli whose effect is
to undermine identities (be they personal, national, or whatever). As I’ve written elsewhere:
…These trends [of national disintegration] are evident when one considers the
impact of television, video games, cellphones, computers, the internet, and such
“social media” outlets as Twitter and Facebook. A society in which most people
spend an inordinate amount of their time sitting in front of TVs, playing video
games, shopping online, searching for soulmates through internet dating, imbibing
bits of information in short bursts from an endless variety of global news and
entertainment sources, and electronically “chatting” with acquaintances or
strangers located anywhere from the next room to the other side of the world—such
a society does not have much of a tangible national culture, and its “imagined
community” is indeed imaginary, a mere abstraction with little basis in concrete
reality. In short, the individualistic, passive, and consumerist nature of a capitalist
society saturated by electronic media is interpersonally alienating and destructive
of civil society, hence destructive of a shared national consciousness.46
Moreover, the fact that electronic technology makes possible nearly instantaneous communication
across the world means that the kind of community it fosters is global rather than national. One
may start to feel more affinity for people ten thousand miles away than for one’s compatriots.
Global social movements become easier to coordinate; things like the Arab Spring and Occupy
Wall Street can emerge to break down national barriers and birth a global consciousness.
The worldwide hegemony of finance and the transnational corporation is similarly destructive of
traditional civil society, and thus of the nation. For it has contributed to deindustrialization in
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advanced countries, the virtual destruction of organized labor, the rise of a precariat of insecure
workers living on society’s margins, the erosion of the welfare state, the privatization of such
public resources as education and the natural environment, the hollowing out of state regulation of
the economy, and the onset of economic crisis and stagnation. All these circumstances tend to
bring about a relative equality of conditions between countries, as a creeping Third-Worldization
of the West occurs. The very idea of “America” or “Britain” or “France”—a substantive national
community that differs from others—becomes threadbare, a transparent fig leaf for the naked
pursuit of power by moneyed elites.
The state, too, is in decline, though perhaps less obviously than the idea of the national community.
The reason is simply that the global community of capitalists will not let the Western state reverse
its post-1970s policies of retrenchment, which is the only way for it to adequately address all the
crises that are currently ripping society apart. If any state—unimaginably—made truly substantive
moves to restore and expand programs of social welfare, or to vastly expand and improve public
education, or to initiate programs like Franklin Roosevelt’s Works Progress Administration or
Tennessee Valley Authority (but on a necessarily broader scale than in the 1930s), or to restore
organized labor to its power in the 1960s and thereby raise aggregate demand, investors would flee
it and its sources of funds would dry up. It could hardly carry out such policies anyway, given the
massive resistance they would provoke among all sectors of the business community. Fiscal
austerity is, on the whole, good for profits (in the short term), since it squeezes the population and
diverts money to the ruling class. In large part because of capital’s high mobility and consequent
wealth and power over both states and populations, the West’s contemporary political paradigm
of relative austerity and government retrenchment is effectively irreversible for the foreseeable
future.
This raises an obvious question: how is the state to deal with social discontent? In the 1930s and
1940s, states adapted to discontent mainly by becoming more inclusive and increasing their control
over capital.47 But since that is no longer an option, what’s the solution? Evidently the most
immediate and urgent response is repression. This is the natural instinct of every power-structure
when confronted by resistance: destroy it, stamp it out, for instance by imprisoning people,
demonizing dissidents as “extremists” or “terrorists,” and deploying police forces to smash popular
movements. So far this has been, and will probably continue to be, the dominant political response
to the contemporary crisis. A quasi-police state is taking the place of the welfare state, as can be
seen from governments’ investment in “national security,” greater powers of surveillance, the
militarizing of police forces, the ever-more-frequent suspension of civil liberties, etc. These
measures do not signify the health of the state; they are its desperate response to a terminal illness.
National governments are being hamstrung and privatized by capital even as their subject
populations are rising up in revolt. The main recourse, it seems, is to militarize society—i.e., to
expand one of the few government powers capital doesn’t object to, the power to suppress
democratic resistance.
In short, durable “compromises” between labor and capital are no longer possible. Only the nationstate could be a framework for such a compromise, because only national governments (not local
or regional) potentially have the power to stand up to corporate capital and regulate it. But they
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have lost this power on the scale necessary since the 1970s. So what will ensue in the coming
decades is a global conflict between the capitalist hyper-elite—together with its political
minions—and the majority of the species, a conflict that this time will not be resolved by the
principle of nationality, because it is dying. Almost two hundred years after the Communist
Manifesto, Marx’s time has arrived. The time for true internationalism, which is to say
transnationalism, in anti-capitalist (and anti-statist) movements has arrived, at long last.48 A
hundred years ago there was no such internationalism in labor movements, as the two nationalist
world wars—largely supported by organized labor—showed. Nor was there in the context of the
Cold War, as the reactionary and imperialistic stances of the U.S.’s AFL-CIO showed. Only since
NAFTA, and especially since the Seattle demonstrations against the WTO in 1999, have labor
unions and social movements in general really begun to realize their internationalist potential.49
A leader of Brazil’s Landless Workers’ Movement says it well: “It is very striking that it is only
now that farmers are starting to achieve a degree of worldwide coordination, after five hundred
years of capitalist development… The new phase of capitalism has itself created the conditions for
farmers to unite against the neoliberal model.”50 And the neoliberal model, to repeat, is not some
drastic new departure but only the logical conclusion of tendencies that have operated in capitalism
for many centuries, namely privatization, marketization, the commodification of everything,
suppression of workers’ power, class polarization, integration of the world under the aegis of
capitalist relations of production, and ever-increasing capital mobility. These tendencies have
finally reached the point that they are consuming nation-states and making both possible and
necessary globally coordinated resistance in the form of transnational social movements. This
global confrontation with capital, in fact, is really what Marxism was all about to begin with. The
slogan “Workers of the World, Unite!”, far from being outdated, has become more timely and
necessary than ever before.
There is more to say about the decline of the nation-state, but I’ll skip to the main point: what the
retrenchment of government’s “beneficent” functions is making possible, for the first time ever, is
the paradigm of revolution I described above when critiquing Marx’s theory. Given the state’s
growing incapacity to assuage discontent, movements of a decentralized, semi-interstitial,
regional, democratic character are emerging to fill the vacuum. In the long run they, or the
institutions they spawn, may take over some of the functions of the national state, such as partially
providing for social welfare. Even more importantly, they will enable the construction of new
production relations in the shell of a corporate capitalist economy that cannot provide billions of
people with a livelihood. These relations will spread all over the world, in an agonizingly slow
process that will surely take well over a hundred years—because social transitions on the scale of
capitalism-to-“cooperativism” do not happen quickly.
But how will such a transition happen? I’ll address this question empirically in the following
section, but here I can at least sketch the historical logic. Marxists and other radicals often object
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that the sorts of developments I’ll describe shortly are merely interstitial and apolitical, can be coopted by the ruling class, can function as stabilizing forces for society, are compelled to
compromise with capitalism, and therefore do not represent viable paths to a post-capitalist
future.51 There may, indeed, be some truth to these objections when the social context is one of
basic systemic stability, i.e., when society isn’t in a “revolutionary situation” anyway. But when it
is—when the social fabric is disintegrating, economic crisis is throwing millions out of work, class
polarization is growing—these “interstitial” developments can potentially have revolutionary
significance. The logic is that as political protest spreads and the ruling class grows ever more
fearful, some of its more progressive members and institutions split off from the rest and throw
their support to un-capitalist or semi-capitalist initiatives as a desperate way to keep the masses
obedient and society under control. Again, this is how the New Deal state was born in the U.S. But
since such a state is becoming increasingly untenable, the ruling class’s hopes for stabilizing
society will, to some extent, lie in more localized and decentralized democratic experiments (in
addition, as I said, to political repression). The combination of mass agitation and ruling-class
support will ensure that these experiments spread, especially because in all likelihood there will
be no foreseeable end to the economic crisis. In the long run, the result will be capitalism’s selfundermining by means of its forced support for a proliferation of people-empowering measures.
Their popularity and success, moreover, will generate a dynamic by which they spread of their
own momentum, so to speak. The success of the new “bottom-up” economy will make the old topdown one increasingly obsolete, although of course innumerable political clashes will have to
occur before it can be unseated from the summits of power.
In short, the state and ruling class will, whether consciously or not, adopt two overarching
strategies to maintain their power: try to repress dissidents, and assist progressive initiatives that
seem comparatively unthreatening. In “liberal” societies confronted by massive and sustained
protest, such a dual approach is necessary, because repression alone is unsustainable, does not
address the underlying causes of protest, and (as the government’s sole strategy) is unacceptable
to large portions of the public and the elite. On local, regional, and national scales, the ruling class
will try to smash radical movements even as it (or a section of it) tentatively supports such things
as public banking, municipal enterprise, cooperatives, enlightened use of eminent domain,52 and
communal self-help institutions of various kinds. But political dissent will, if anything, only
spread, not go away. One can expect that, in a world of multiform crisis, alliances will naturally
emerge between different movements on the left some of which (like the effort to build co-ops)
are less explicitly “political” than others. The progress of these interstitial initiatives, therefore,
will aid the progress of the mass political movements, and vice versa, such that corporate
capitalism will be slowly hollowed out even as it loses ideological hegemony. Its opponents will
command more and more resources, which itself will make possible their command over even
more resources, in a self-reinforcing cycle somewhat comparable to the early-modern
bourgeoisie’s gradual erosion of feudalism’s (and later absolutism’s) economic, political, and
ideological hegemony. The more economic success one has, the more resources one has, which
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means the more propaganda one can churn out and so attract people to one’s agenda (including by
getting socialists elected to political office).
As for the question whether alternative economic institutions can indeed be more “successful” than
capitalist ones, that is to say more productive and socially equitable: one of the purposes of my
book is to show that they can. Cooperatives can be more effective than conventional businesses
even by the narrow standards of capitalism. We shouldn’t necessarily condemn co-ops for having
to work within the confines of capitalism, for if they become common and network with each other
and other progressive organizations they might prove to be of use to left-wing political movements,
by providing them with resources and spreading an anti-capitalist ethos. Furthermore, as greater
numbers of co-ops support one another, each will be less shackled to the logic of capitalism. The
economic success of these and other alternative-economy institutions—in part a result of their
mutual support—will then serve as its own public-relations campaign, so to speak, attracting
people to new models and thus contributing to the spread of alternative modes of production beside
the old dysfunctional capitalist mode.
Another way to conceptualize the coming social transformations is to return to the idea that the
main problem the economy is facing is low aggregate demand (disguised, to be sure, by
astronomical levels of debt). The question, then, is how to comprehensively raise demand. We
know that the old Keynesian solution was high government spending and high wages for workers,
but both those options are, in the long run, off the table in an era of austerity, government
privatization, and neoliberal globalization. A sustained Keynesianism on the colossal and
international scale necessary is simply out of the question. The only other solution, and the only
appropriate one in an age of decaying nation-states, is to construct new kinds of social relations
that economically empower people, i.e., raise demand. To repeat, what many of these will
ultimately amount to are new production relations, on the basis of which will, necessarily, arise
new social and political structures. Thus, virtually by analytical necessity it is evident that
profound social revolution offers the only way out of the contemporary economic crisis. The
slowness of the revolution is what will allow members of the ruling class to support it, for it will
appear that all they are doing is defusing mass unrest by means of piecemeal reforms. But these
reforms will be of a very different character from those of the earlier welfare state. Rather than
being essentially corporatist, i.e., giving greater power to a national state that is fused with
corporate capitalism, they will consist of a democratic transformation of social relations “from the
ground up.”
Of course, the state is not going away anytime soon. In fact, it will likely have to become more
inclusive in the coming decades in order to adapt to social crisis. However, the ways in which it
becomes inclusive will be relatively new: given the different political economy we live in than
sixty years ago, they will be in some respects less centralized and less corporatist, involving a
devolution of governmental powers and greater international coordination on multiple levels of
governance.

Practice
In the tradition of Marxism, we’ll follow our theoretical discussion with a focus on practice, which
is, if anything, more important than theory. The point is to change the world, not just to interpret
it. As I said earlier, here I’ll focus not on worker cooperatives in the U.S. but on other initiatives
springing up around the world. Needless to say, there are many to choose from. People and
governments everywhere are experimenting with alternative economic, social, and political
arrangements. Some of these will not last or will prove to be of limited importance; others may
end up serving as models for a future society. In the following I’ll describe some initiatives that
strike me as particularly promising and interesting.
A reasonable starting point is Quebec’s social economy, which is a sophisticated set of interlocking
institutions that has matured since the 1980s. The term “social economy” just refers to the third
sector in economies, between the private and the public sector. It is composed of such things as
housing associations, civic societies, nonprofits, charities, cooperatives, and credit unions—
institutions that are at least in part run by community members and exist not to pay profits to
shareholders but to benefit communities, the environment, and marginalized groups. The social
economy has ethical aims, but the seemingly opposed imperatives of ethics and “efficiency” are
by no means mutually exclusive. Very often one finds that the more ethical an institution is, the
more profitable, productive, and efficient it is. Likewise, bureaucracy, gigantic size, and
slavishness to the interests of big capital not only are immoral (inhumane and undemocratic) but
have costs even by the narrow standards of efficiency and effectiveness. Being run by people
whose goals are ethical, the social economy contributes to job creation, the provision of services,
the production of goods, community revitalization, and in general sustainable development.
Quebec’s social economy is famous, and has been intensively studied, because of its sophistication
and effectiveness. I won’t describe it in great detail here, but it comprises over 7,000 organizations
that provide an array of services to the population. A watershed moment for it occurred in 1996,
when the state invited representatives of all these actors—among which are “citizen’s committees,
food banks, community centers, family economy cooperative associations, community health
clinics, legal clinics, not-for-profit childcare centers,”53 housing co-ops, women’s centers,
workers’ co-ops, community economic development corporations, labor unions, and
environmental associations—to participate in a conference on the future of Quebec in light of its
problems with unemployment and economic development. The result was the subsequent
institutionalized collaboration between the state at all levels and these diverse organizations, a
collaboration that “involve[s], among other things, making it much easier for non-profit
associations engaged in social economy activities to acquire the necessary financial resources,
through government grants, indirect subsidies, or access to credit; the creation of a social economy
office within the provincial government; and the consolidation of an umbrella organization in civil
society, the Chantier de l’économie sociale, to coordinate strategies for enlarging and deepening
the role of the social economy.”54 Few social economies in the world have achieved this degree of
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institutional coherence and coordination, which explains why activists and policymakers have
been so intrigued by the Quebec model.
In general, the global social economy can be expected to grow in the coming generations, as
national governments prove incapable of fulfilling their welfare and regulatory functions.
Quebec’s social economy, for example, continues to grow in extent and access to capital. An
innovation in 2007 was the creation of the Fiducie du Chantier de l’économie sociale, “a $53.8
million patient capital or quasi-equity fund to enable collective enterprises to embark on long-term
planning, invest in real estate, and move out of a vicious cycle of debt.”55 A couple of years later,
a financial network called CAP Finance was established to connect microcredit organizations,
local development funds, large “labor solidarity” funds, and so on. The mainstream economy’s
travails after 2008 did not hinder any of this activity; on the contrary, “amidst the debris of
speculative financial markets” it became easier to interest investors in the Fiducie’s stable rates of
return.56
Europe’s social economy is just as vital as Quebec’s. As reported in 2012 by the European
Economic and Social Committee (EESC), the social economy accounts for over 14.5 million jobs
and about 6.5 percent of total paid employment in Europe.57 Since the last quarter of the twentieth
century the social economy has grown considerably, so that it is increasingly taking the place of
the state in creating employment and correcting economic and social imbalances. It is also
achieving greater recognition as an important actor in European affairs, as reports on it are
published by the EESC, the UN declares the social economy to be crucial for global development,
Europe-wide statutes for cooperatives are adopted, conferences on cooperatives and the social
economy are organized, new legal forms are created to accommodate social enterprises, university
courses on the social economy appear, and, in 2012, a social economy minister is appointed in
France’s government. As in Quebec, this sector of the economy is faring relatively well in
conditions of economic stagnation; for instance, it has been able to deploy “its own alternative
forms of solidarity funding, such as ethical banking, social currencies or the credit unions, which
are not only providing credit but are also generating trust in its financial services.” 58 Similarly,
employment levels are proving more stable than those of the private sector. It’s true that recent
cutbacks in public spending have had a damaging effect, but they have not been devastating.
A few random figures indicate the sector’s vitality. In France, the social economy (which accounts
for 10 percent of salaried employment) created 18 percent of all new jobs between 2006 and 2008.
Its employment level increased by 2.9 percent (70,000 new jobs) between 2008 and 2009, while
in the private sector it sank by 1.6 percent and in the public sector by 4.2 percent. Similarly, in
Italy, employment in cooperatives increased by 8 percent between 2007 and 2011, while in the
conventional private sector it decreased by 2.3 percent. In Spain, too, employment in worker
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cooperatives grew by 4.7 percent in 2011, as it dropped in the rest of the private sector for the
fourth consecutive year.59
Related to the social economy, and often considered a part of it, is the solidarity economy, which
tends to be a little more political and anti-capitalist than the social economy as a whole. The values
that inspire its participants are the opposite of capitalist: community, egalitarianism, and
democracy. Like its more well-known cousin, the solidarity economy started growing
exponentially in the last quarter of the twentieth century, as neoliberalism ravaged Latin America
and other parts of the world. The solidarity economy’s chief impetus came from social movements
in Latin America, which has a long history of peasant- and indigenous-based resistance to Western
imperialism. In the past, this resistance helped bring about things like the Mexican and Cuban
revolutions, the “developmentalist” period of South American history between the 1930s and
1960s, Chile’s dalliance with a kind of democratic proto-socialism in the early 1970s (until it was
crushed by the U.S. and Pinochet), and attempts at revolution in Central America in the 1980s.
Since the 1990s, it has birthed Latin America’s 21st-century turn to the left (for example with the
elections of Hugo Chavez, Lula da Silva, Evo Morales, Rafael Correa, and Daniel Ortega) and
helped birth such global movements as fair trade, solidarity lending, the expansion of
cooperativism and credit unions, the World Social Forum and its offshoots, and La Via Campesina.
Among the practices that are often mentioned in the context of the solidarity economy are
community-supported agriculture, urban gardening, alternative currencies, collective kitchens, and
community land trusts, not to mention all the more familiar forms of cooperativism (producer,
consumer, housing, agricultural, etc.).
Before going into more detail about some of these phenomena, it will be worthwhile to consider
just how significant the solidarity economy and its conceptual relatives are becoming. In a sense,
after all, the term is nothing but a name for the ideal that all “radicals” are fighting for: it is
socialism, anti-capitalism, cooperativism, economic democracy, whatever your preferred name is.
The post-capitalist economy will have to incorporate the “solidarity” structures that are emerging,
and in fact it will, to a large extent, be grounded in them. Especially if you broaden the concept of
solidarity economy so that it encompasses public banking, municipal enterprise, benefit
corporations, and participatory budgeting (all to be discussed below), its contemporary
significance is undeniable. It is, in short, the terrain of the “movement of movements” against
privatization and profit-mongering, aimed at the resurrection of public space, whether embodied
in the World Social Forum, Occupy Wall Street, or any of the countless dissident movements
rocking the globe.
A clear indication of the growing importance of the solidarity economy is its ever-greater
institutionalization. A rather primitive gauge of this is the proliferation of relevant websites, such
as yesmagazine.org, geo.coop, shareable.net, ripess.org, community-wealth.org, and
neweconomy.net. More substantively, dozens of international networks have been formed recently
to facilitate organizing and education, including Alliance for a Responsible, Plural and Solidarity
Economy (ALOE), the Intercontinental Network for the Promotion of the Social Solidarity
Economy (RIPESS), the U.S. Solidarity Economy Network (SEN), the Asian Alliance for
Solidarity Economy, the European Institute for Solidarity Economy (INESS), and many
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organizations in Latin America. One must include all the social forums that exist even in the
conservative U.S.: the U.S. Social Forum, the Midwest Social Forum, the Social Forum of the
Americas, the European Social Forum, etc. Like their progenitor the World Social Forum, which
began in 2001 and has met almost annually, these are essentially periodic conferences where
activists and organizations involved in the alter-globalization movement can come together to
share ideas, strategies, and experiences, attend workshops and lectures, network and seed new
institutions. The WSF regularly draws more than 60,000 participants from around the world.60
Perhaps even more striking than the proliferation of all these networks, organizations, and
conferences is the recognition that the solidarity economy is receiving from governments. I already
mentioned the creation of the new post of Minister for the Social Solidarity Economy in the French
government. Compared to Latin America, however, France is behind the times. For example, in
2003 Brazil’s president Lula established a National Secretariat of the Solidarity Economy, and
cooperatives receive financial support from the ministries of Agricultural and Social Development.
The Brazilian government also funds university programs that provide local groups with training
and support to set up cooperatives or social enterprises, “similar to business incubators in the
U.S.”61 (Cooperative business programs have started to appear in North American universities
too.) Ecuador went a step further in 2008: it adopted a constitution that draws from the social and
solidarity economy (SSE) model for development, in that it formalizes commitments to food
sovereignty, the use of land for social and environmental functions (forbidding large estate
farming, land concentration, and the privatization of water), a “decentralized national system of
participatory planning” for development, and numerous other progressive principles that are
fleshed out in very concrete ways. Bolivia’s 2009 constitution is similarly progressive. Public
policy initiatives in the SSE have been flowering in Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Peru,
and elsewhere, under the pressure of growing social movements.
Governments in Africa and Asia are likewise facilitating the growth of the SSE, though I cannot
review all the relevant policies here. The South African government, for example, has passed
legislation to boost cooperatives, and in 2012 further legislation to establish a cooperative council,
academy, and development agency was proposed.62 Africa’s tenth ministerial conference on the
theme of cooperatives was held in Rwanda in 2012; 27 countries committed to passing laws to
support the SSE, expanding education regarding the creation and sustainability of co-ops,
increasing regional cooperation and trade among co-ops, and possibly creating integrated financial
cooperatives at country and regional levels.63 Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey launched in 2012
a national cooperative strategy and plan of action to fundamentally restructure the cooperative
sector so as to make it more effective, competitive, and sustainable. 64 India and Indonesia have
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recently reformed their laws regarding co-ops. Since the early 2000s, the Russian government—
at all levels—has actively supported the cooperative movement.65 Indeed, on the whole it seems
there are few governments in the world that do not provide notable support, and are not increasing
their support year by year, for the social and solidarity economy.
The UN and its specialized agency the ILO have been taking action too; in fact, they have
facilitated many of the policy initiatives just mentioned, particularly in 2012, which the UN
declared the Year of the Cooperative. What this designation concretely meant was a year of intense
advocacy and organizational support for co-ops, so as to publicize their worldwide impact on
poverty reduction, social integration, and socioeconomic development. (The website
social.un.org/coopsyear showcases the UN’s work in this area.) As the UN sponsors international
summits, forums, ministerial conferences, film festivals, and other events to spread the ideology
of cooperativism, the ILO publishes in-depth reports, sponsors cooperative projects, aids in the
formation of policy, and helps organize conferences like the SSE Academy, which began in 2010.
The SSE Academy is “an inter-regional training event bringing together more than 100 [in fact as
many as 300] practitioners and policy-makers from around the world, to share their experiences
and meet leading SSE specialists.”66 Among other achievements, the 2013 conference helped
further the ILO’s initiative to establish an Interagency Task Force in the United Nations that would
bring “relevant UN agencies together for regular exchanges on their programming and policy
making in the field of SSE.”67
As for the actual practices of the solidarity economy “on the ground,” I can at best hope merely to
gesture at a few examples in the limited space here. The classic example is Brazil’s Landless
Workers’ Movement (MST), which began in 1984 and now has a membership of 1.5 million
people. Its main political goal is to bring about national agrarian reform that eliminates the extreme
inequality in ownership of land; much of its activity consists of occupying unused land and
establishing encampments on it, which become permanent settlements if the occupiers gain legal
ownership. The encampments and settlements can be organized on the basis either of family
ownership or of collective ownership, depending on the decisions of local assemblies. Each
settlement is structured as a mini-society (with extensive ties to other settlements and to state,
regional, and national leaders), which collectively decides how the settlers’ income is to be spent—
how much will go to production, health care, schooling, and so forth. The MST as a whole has
established hundreds of agricultural cooperatives that take in more than 50 million dollars a year,
some of which goes to the 20-million-dollar budget for social services and infrastructure, the rest
of which goes directly to member families. The movement also has founded teacher-training
programs in national universities, hundreds of daycare centers, an agricultural college, almost two
thousand primary and secondary schools, several credit cooperatives, 96 food processing plants, a
clothing factory, etc.—all of which are ancillary to its main achievements of organizing over
250,000 occupations and winning land for over 350,000 families in two thousand settlements, in
addition to the 200,000 families that are currently occupying land but do not yet legally own it.
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The MST’s success has won it international recognition, embodied in grants from UNESCO and
UNICEF and awards from the UN.68
The MST clearly parallels the solidarity economy in general: it is both a model of a future
democratic, socialist society and a means of bringing it about. More specifically, as activist Ethan
Miller says, the means to the end is that “building relationships between solidarity-based
enterprises and larger social movements builds increased support for the solidarity economy while
allowing the movements to meet some of the basic needs of their participants, demonstrate viable
alternatives, and thus increase the power and scope of their transformative work.” 69 It is worth
noting, incidentally, that the MST belongs to the Brazilian Solidarity Economy Forum, which
“works on an even broader scale [than the MST], incorporating [as of 2006] twelve national
networks and membership organizations with twenty-one regional Solidarity Forums and
thousands of cooperative enterprises to build mutual support systems, facilitate exchanges, create
cooperative incubator programs, and shape public policy.”70 This is, or may someday herald, the
revolution in action.
A broad category, and a particularly well-known one, of the solidarity economy is the movement
known as Fair Trade, which has expanded significantly in the last couple of decades. As defined
by the World Fair Trade Organization (in association with Fairtrade International, the Network of
European Worldshops, and the European Fair Trade Association), Fair Trade is a “trading
partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect, that seeks greater equity in international
trade. It contributes to sustainable development by offering better trading conditions to, and
securing the rights of, marginalized producers and workers—especially in the South.”71 More
specifically, it “promotes standards for production practices and delivery procedures, working
conditions and labour remuneration, environmental care and social policies in supply chains of
certified goods.”72 The Fair Trade Labeling Organization (FLO) was established in 1997 to set
standards worldwide and certify that particular products embody these standards. Among the
growing range of goods that the certification system can cover are coffee, bananas, sugar, oranges,
tea, chocolate, wine, rice, honey, flowers, cosmetics, and clothing. As the Fair Trade movement
has gone mainstream, with large retailers selling certified products, the worldwide volume of sales
has increased; in 2018, for example, sales were up to 9.8 billion euros, 15 percent higher than the
previous year.
The way Fair Trade works is quite complex, but the main point is that for a product to be Fairtradecertified it has to have been produced and traded under conditions characterized by, for instance,
the absence of child labor and forced labor, workers’ freedom to unionize, compliance with ILO
conventions on working conditions, respect for the environment, commitment to gender equity
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and poverty reduction, and the importer’s payment to the producing organization (e.g., an
agricultural cooperative) of both a specified minimum price and a premium. The minimum price
helps shield farmers from the volatility of world markets, while the premium goes into a fund that
farmers and workers can use for community purposes, as they see fit. Producers and traders who
want to sell Fairtrade-labeled products have to pay a fee to FLO, which inspects them to certify
that they adhere to the requisite standards.
Studies have shown that, so far, Fair Trade (FT) has had mixed results in terms of improving local
conditions and empowering farmers and workers. On the one hand, “guaranteed Fair Trade market
outlets and stable prices provide incentives to producers to realise on-farm investments, intensify
input applications and enhance labour use.”73 FT associations and cooperatives can provide
farmers with technical assistance and administer social and environmental projects made possible
by the FT premium. Land and labor productivity are thereby raised above those of non-FT
producers, which translates into higher household income and willingness to invest in long-term
projects. According to some studies, FT producers report a greater sense of well-being and a more
positive outlook for their future than non-FT producers do. Nutritional standards are higher and
infant mortality rates lower than in households without access to Fair Trade organizations.
Participation in Fair Trade has been found to reduce farmers’ economic vulnerability, assist in
poverty reduction, enhance family stability, improve children’s education, strengthen the role of
women in their community, and benefit the natural environment.74
On the other hand, these positive effects are not universally observed, in part because the
certification process is not foolproof and FT standards are not consistently enforced. There are
relatively few impact studies of Fair Trade, and the ones that exist do not always have sound
methodologies. One thing known for sure is that few FT producers are able to sell most of their
product to FT outlets, because of insufficient demand. Fair Trade is still a very small fraction of
global trade even in such commodities as coffee and bananas; about 1.5 million farmers and
workers around the world participate in it.75 In 2011, FT producer revenues in the export of coffee,
bananas, cocoa beans, and cane sugar were less than 1 percent of the global value of exports
(although FT markets are growing at a brisk pace).76 Some critics worry, too, that as FT becomes
more mainstream, it is losing its commitment to the values that originally sustained it. Other
common criticisms are that FT doesn’t necessarily benefit migrant laborers, that its impact on nonFT producers is ambiguous at best, that the premiums consumers pay do not always directly benefit
farmers, and that FT’s consumer-driven model means it “cannot address the core problem of
excessively concentrated markets in which a handful of over-powerful transnational corporations
dictate terms of trade and suck profits up into their own coffers.”77
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Insofar as there is justice to these criticisms, the best answer to them is probably the one that
applies to all initiatives in the solidarity economy: they cannot realize their transformative potential
unless backed up by social and political movements. But if they are, and if the capitalist state feels
compelled to tolerate and support them, then they can indeed be components of systemic change.
Fair Trade has already raised consciousness in the global North, making people more aware of
conditions in the South and proving that consumers are willing to pay extra for products if doing
so benefits farmers and workers. The task now is the admittedly difficult one of making the
movement more mainstream while simultaneously shoring up its commitment to strict standards
of producer empowerment. As producers improve their living standards, get access to more
resources, and develop a greater sense of collective self-worth, they will have more success in
pressing for political changes in their own countries. Fair Trade can also potentially assist in
building solidarity movements in the North, and it can provide issues on which to pressure
governments—and resources by which to do so. It is true, though, that ultimately the main
component of systemic change is the transformation of the class structure, and here Fair Trade, in
its current form, must play a subordinate role. The main strategic emphasis has to be on movements
that directly attack the power of transnational corporations and aim to bypass them by organizing
economic activity through different paths. What those paths will be is still not clear.
There are obvious possibilities, however—and even obvious necessities. As author John Restakis
argues, any future moral—and sustainable—regime of global trade will have to give a central place
to agricultural cooperatives of the sorts that already exist across the South (and North). Only
cooperatives, whether of separately producing farmers or of workers who collectively manage a
single farm, can provide producers with the democratic agency and protections they need. One
relevant model of a regional economy is the so-called Emilian Model, named after the EmiliaRomagna region of northern Italy. This system that permits small farmers organized in
cooperatives to produce many of Italy’s food products could be replicated in other parts of the
world, with assistance from the global cooperative and Fair Trade movements. It is worth quoting
some of Restakis’s speculations on this score:
The global co-operative movement contains within itself the material
resources to do what the fair trade movement alone cannot do. Credit is one
example. The credit unions of both rich and poor nations have the capital to
establish a Fair Trade and Development Bank to do what the World bank and the
IMF will never do—give direct support to farmer organizations, NGOs, business
groups and local communities to build regional economies based on democratic
control and ownership. An international co-operative development bank with
members and progressive stakeholders from among consumers in the North and
small producers in the South could provide the credit necessary to fuel the kind of
value-added development that is now beginning to emerge in these areas. Among
its top priorities would be to build up local credit unions that can play a regional
role in this development process. This has already begun. The World Council of
Credit Unions (WCCU) and the national co-operative federations of many countries
have been working to build the development infrastructure of Southern regions for
many years…78
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What the future holds for global trade is anyone’s guess, but it isn’t impossible to imagine a new
regime that gives a more prominent place to Fair Trade organizations, regulatory structures that
protect small farmers, and regional coordination of development among cooperatives and local
governments.
Turning to the North, in particular the U.S., recent research has illuminated potentially
revolutionary developments of a different character than those we have been discussing. Gar
Alperovitz is the scholar who has, arguably, done the most work on this subject, and his book What
Then Must We Do? Straight Talk about the Next American Revolution (2013) is essential reading.
Alperovitz is not alone, however: a veritable industry of reportage and scholarship has grown to
document the systemic alternatives that are emerging throughout the North. As these alternatives
become more widely known, one can expect them to continue spreading on an almost exponential
scale, as people clamor for change.
One example that Alperovitz discusses is “municipal enterprise,” effectively a kind of small-scale
socialism whereby local government owns and operates properties and businesses. As the website
Community-Wealth.org reports, “Increasingly, local governments have turned to municipal
enterprise to both raise revenue and promote local jobs and economic stability by developing a
more diversified base of locally controlled wealth.”79 For instance, there are over two thousand
publicly owned electric utilities in the U.S., which, together with a number of co-ops, collectively
supply 25 percent of U.S. electricity—more efficiently and at lower cost to the consumer than
private utilities do. Hundreds of cities have built public internet networks too, and hundreds more
are building them now.80 Many other cities are involved in hotel construction and ownership,
hospital ownership, transit development projects, ownership of land that is leased to companies
for a profit, and environmentally friendly businesses like methane-recovery.
Important initiatives are in the works on the state level as well, most notably, perhaps, proposals
to establish public state banks. North Dakota is the only state that has such a bank; it has been in
operation since 1919. Its public bank is one reason why North Dakota was the only state to have a
continuous budget surplus in the years after 2008. As Ellen Brown noted in 2011, “The bank has
contributed over $300 million in revenues over the last decade to state coffers, a substantial sum
for a state with a population less than one-tenth the size of Los Angeles County.”81 Public banks
allow governments to invest in local communities, in ways that actually benefit the community
rather than some distant corporate elite. Accordingly, a public banking movement is growing:
thirty states, for example, have proposed legislation to establish a state-owned bank.82 Counties
and municipalities are likewise beginning to consider proposals for public banks.
Another type of institution that seems to have transformative potential is the benefit corporation
(B Corp), which is a new legal form created in 2010. This kind of corporation differs from others
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in that “the goal is both to make profits and to use some part of them for social purposes.”83
Shareholders cannot sue these businesses for failing to prioritize profits above all else, as they can
in the case of a conventional corporation. The depth of public support for B Corps, and in general
for a new, more socially conscious way of conducting economic activity, is shown by the fact that
33 states have passed laws for benefit corporations.84 The number in early 2010, again, was zero.
More common than B Corps—because older—are community development corporations (CDCs),
community development financial institutions (CDFIs), and community land trusts. CDCs are
nonprofit organizations dedicated to bringing about the revitalization of a clearly
defined geographic area—often an urban neighborhood scarred by decades of
disinvestment and concentrated poverty or an isolated and underdeveloped rural
area. Governed by boards of directors composed primarily of local residents and
other citizens with a strong stake in the community, most CDCs engage in some
form of economic development within their service areas.85
They have been most successful at housing development, but in the twenty-first century have tried
to return to the vision of their original founders (in the 1960s) and engage in “comprehensive
economic, social, and political development activities,” including community-owned and controlled business development and economic revitalization. By 2005, 4,600 CDCs had created
over 1,252,000 units of affordable housing and generated 774,000 jobs.86 They rely for funding on
nonprofits, foundations, corporations, and all levels of government. CDFIs, similarly, are
institutions that give credit to communities shunned by traditional lenders; they include community
development banks, community development credit unions, microcredit programs, etc.
Community land trusts, on the other hand, of which there are several hundred in the U.S., are
nonprofit corporations that hold and lease land to keep it affordable for the community by
removing it from the sphere of the market. The National Community Land Trust Network states
that the purposes of these nonprofits are “to provide access to land and housing to people who are
otherwise denied access; to increase long-term community control of neighborhood resources; to
empower residents through involvement and participation in the organization; and to preserve the
affordability of housing permanently.”87 What their long-term potential may be is still not clear,
but if sufficient public pressure is broad to bear on government, they could become of more than
marginal significance.
The same is true of the more experimental and radical movement to establish “Transition Towns”
around the world, where initiatives exist to “rebuild local agriculture and food production,
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localiz[e] energy production, rethink healthcare, rediscover local building materials in the context
of zero energy building, [and] rethink how we manage waste.”88 As Richard Heinberg
characterizes it, “the ‘transition’ that’s being referred to is away from our current growth-based,
fossil-fueled economy and toward a future economy that is not only sustainable but also fulfilling
and interesting for all concerned.”89 The movement began in 2005 in Totnes, England, and has
spread to several thousand towns in over fifty countries, all of which have initiatives inspired by
the belief that “communities must become more resilient in the face of three catastrophic threats:
peak oil, global warming and economic instability.”90 These initiatives include such projects as
community gardens, community-owned energy production, community-owned bakeries and
breweries, local currencies, and programs to incubate sustainable businesses. One celebrated
initiative is called Transition Streets, which, in Totnes, “brought residents together, block by block,
to support each other in decreasing their home energy use through improvements like insulation
and solar panels. On average, each of the 550 participating households cut its annual carbon use
by 1.3 tons and its annual energy bill by £570 (about $883).”91 Such projects admittedly seem too
tiny to make much of a difference, but this may change as they become more common and
publicized. The vision of “localization” that is behind them is likely to be ever more appealing,
indeed necessary for survival, as the capitalist status quo disintegrates in the next century (or less).
Turning to politics, a radical reform called participatory budgeting is gaining momentum around
the world. First developed in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 1988, when the Workers’ Party was elected,
it has spread to over 7,000 cities on all inhabited continents. Erik Olin Wright describes its
functioning in Porto Alegre as follows:
Without going into details, the basic idea [of municipal participatory budgeting] is
that citizens meet in popular assemblies throughout the city to deliberate about how
the city budget should be spent. Most of these assemblies are organized around
geographical regions of the city; a few are organized around themes with a citywide scope—like public transportation or culture. At the beginning of the budget
cycle each year these assemblies meet in plenary sessions. City executives,
administrators, representatives of community entities such as neighborhood
associations, youth and sports clubs, and any interested inhabitant of the city attends
these assemblies, but only residents of the region can vote in the regional assembly.
Any city resident participating in a thematic assembly can vote in those. These
assemblies are jointly coordinated by members of municipal government and by
community delegates.92
In Porto Alegre, participatory budgeting has tended to have high levels of participation and
generated positive results. One resident observed in 2002 that before participatory budgeting,
“there was no sewer, school, health clinic, or transportation. Now, a reservoir has been built with
6 million liters of water, the streets have been paved, and a school opened.”93 In fact, as reported
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by the World Bank, “Sewer and water connections in the city…went up from 75 percent of total
households in 1988 to 98 percent in 1997. The number of schools has quadrupled since 1986. Porto
Alegre’s health and education budget increased from 13 percent in 1985 to almost 40 percent in
1996.”94 There has been a “massive shift in spending toward the poorest regions of the city,”
corruption has been dramatically reduced due to transparency, and a “thickening” of civil society
has occurred, with civic groups of all kinds being stimulated by issues of democratic budgeting.95
In the 2000s, participatory budgeting began to spread at an accelerated pace, finally reaching the
United States in 2010 (in Chicago). The impressive successes it has had here and elsewhere are
showcased on the Participatory Budgeting Project’s website, participatorybudgeting.org.
The point, again, is that democracy, cooperation, and transparency are not only ethically
imperative but more socially efficacious than the top-down, corporatized, bureaucratic, secretive
methods of the contemporary ancien régime. When ordinary people have a democratic say in
budget allocation, the money goes where it is needed most, not where it will benefit only some
politically connected corporate interests. Schools are built, streets repaired, libraries expanded,
facilities improved. Poor neighborhoods see more money, and can expect greater accountability,
than they would otherwise. At the same time, involvement in the political process creates a better
informed and more active citizenry, empowering people to form associations and networks through
which they demand ever greater expansions of democracy from political officials. Participatory
democracy reinforces and expands itself, so to speak. It counteracts social atomization, builds
community, militates against apathy, and captures resources for people who will use them to
further improve democracy.
Measures of even greater democratic significance have been enacted in Kerala, India. When
Kerala’s Left Democratic Front coalition came to power in 1996 it began a program of
administrative, fiscal, and political decentralization to 1,214 local governments. This ambitious
campaign took advantage of the 1993 Constitutional mandates to increase local government power
as a response to India’s developmental failures and crisis of democracy.96 A brief summary gives
some sense of the project’s scale:
The nested design of the Campaign’s core institutions—Grama Sabhas (ward-level
assemblies), development seminars, task forces, and local governments—
represents a deliberate attempt to broaden avenues for citizen participation. In every
year since 1997, local governments in Kerala have formulated and implemented
their own development plans. These plans take shape through a multi-stage process
of iterated deliberation between elected representatives, local and higher-level
government officials, civil society experts and activists, and ordinary citizens. The
process begins in open local assemblies, called grama sabhas, in which participants
discuss and identify development priorities. Development seminars formed by the
grama sabhas are then tasked with developing more elaborate assessments of local
problems and needs. The development seminars give way to multi-stakeholder task
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forces that design specific projects for various development sectors. These projects
are in turn submitted to local elected bodies (municipal councils called panchayats)
that formulate and set budgets for local plans. Final plans are presented back to
grama sabhas for discussion. These local plans are then integrated into higher-level
plans (blocks and districts) during which all projects are vetted for technical and
fiscal viability.97
The logistics are very complex, but the campaign seems to have been successful both at
invigorating democracy—it is extremely popular—and at implementing development more
effectively than before. This is partly because “popular involvement increases problem-solving
efficiency through better and more rapid feedback and increases accountability by multiplying the
points of scrutiny.”98 Much greater priority has been given to basic needs like sanitation, housing
and drinking water than in the past, and there are now significant interregional differences as
opposed to the “one-size-fits-all logic of the past.” Just between 1997 and 1999, 98,494 houses
were built, 240,307 sanitary latrines constructed, 50,162 wells dug, 8000 kilometers of roads built,
and 2,800,179 people received support for seedlings and fertilizers—all of which far exceeds
achievements from earlier comparable periods.99 At the same time, corruption has declined
significantly.100
The innovations in Kerala demonstrate the possibility of a politics different from the antidemocratic paradigm of the present. As an alternative economy develops, a Kerala-style politics
may follow in its wake.
***
All these quasi-experimental “non-reformist reforms,” involving millions of people and thousands
of institutions across the world, cannot be a mere historical curiosity.101 They have epochal
potential. One participant contrasts them with the dreams of the old anarchists and socialists who
looked forward to a cooperative commonwealth: “The old cooperativism,” he says, “was a utopia
in search of its practice, and the new cooperativism is a practice in search of its utopia.” 102 The
contrast is apt. The tragedy of the old cooperativism, from a Marxist perspective, is that
consciousness outran material conditions, material possibilities, and so it was doomed to failure;
the new cooperativism has placed consciousness at the service of people’s immediate economic
interests, so that new modes of production and of governance are evolving step by step. Utopian
dreams are being subordinated to economic realities—thus, perhaps, making possible the
realization of “utopian dreams” in the distant future.
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The obvious question, however, is the one that has been posed to radicals from time immemorial:
how will the old world succumb to the new? How is that possible? What will the process look like?
At this moment in history, characterized by a convergence of crises, it is easier to imagine
catastrophe than a new and more stable civilization. We’re rushing headlong into a perfect storm
of crises. For example, the UN projects that the world population will be almost ten billion by
2050, which of course will put severe strain on human and natural resources. At the same time,
global warming is expected to have an incalculably destructive impact on civilization and the
global ecosystem: ocean levels could rise three feet or more by the end of the century; temperatures
will rise at least 2.7 degrees Fahrenheit, probably much more; extreme heat waves will contribute
to difficulty growing food and to massive changes in plant and animal life.103 In addition, the sword
of Damocles hangs over humankind in the form of possible nuclear war, whether provoked by
state or by non-state actors. And then there is the impending long era of economic crisis and
stagnation I’ve already discussed, as well as other forms of ecological destruction besides global
warming. These circumstances are enough to show that there will be no smooth or peaceful
transition to a more equitable and just society.
Some commentators, such as Chris Hedges and Richard Heinberg, insist that we are headed for a
near-apocalyptic scenario. “The steady depletion of natural resources,” Hedges writes, “especially
fossil fuels, along with the accelerated pace of climate change, will combine with crippling levels
of personal and national debt to thrust us into a global depression that will dwarf any in the history
of capitalism.” Heinberg has predicted for years that soon our economic system will “implode”:
And when it does the financial system will seize up far more dramatically than in
2008. You will go to the bank or the ATM and there will be no money. Food will
be scarce and expensive. Unemployment will be rampant. And government services
will break down. Living standards will plummet. “Austerity” programs will become
more draconian. Economic inequality will widen to create massive gaps between a
tiny, oligarchic global elite and the masses. The collapse will also inevitably trigger
the kind of instability and unrest, including riots, that we have seen in countries
such as Greece…104
These dire prophecies may be accurate, or they may be exaggerated. What should be
uncontroversial is that multifaceted crisis is here to stay for a very long time. It’s predictable what
popular reactions to it will be: demonstrations, periodic rioting, looting (e.g., in the case of natural
disasters), perhaps a rise in crime, and grassroots organizing on both the political left and the right.
What will, in large part, determine how it all plays out is the reaction of the ruling class, which
possesses most of society’s resources and so has disproportionate power over the directions in
which history proceeds.
Above I made some rather vague predictions regarding the behavior of governments and the ruling
class, which I will elaborate on now. Of course, it is impossible to predict the long-term future
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with any certainty. For all we know, global warming will destroy most of the species in the next
couple of hundred years, or the collapse of our current world system will lead to a century of wars
over natural resources. Nevertheless, I think it can be useful and interesting to speculate on possible
paths that the future will take—and not only because I consider apocalyptic scenarios to be far
from inevitable. Assuming that human society doesn’t revert to some kind of Hobbesian state of
nature, one can sketch plausible paths of historical development and use those sketches to help
guide strategy.
As I said above, the point to keep in mind is that governments and ruling classes are not monolithic
entities. This fact is what makes possible a paradigm of revolution different from the orthodox
Marxist one: rather than the working class suddenly rising up as one in a titanic social explosion,
bursting through the straitjacket of a unified ruling class that has refused to reform capitalism,
what can and should happen—and has happened in the past—is that popular struggles exploit
divisions in the ranks of the elite so as to achieve gradual (though not “smooth” or “peaceful”)
progress. Many wealthy people and institutions are reactionary, but many are progressive. In order
to accomplish lasting, democratic change, it is necessary for popular movements to get some of
the progressive elite at least partly and provisionally on their side. Universities, nonprofits,
philanthropic foundations, liberal millionaires and billionaires, progressive businesses, and
policymakers are just some of the entities whose wealth and influence can be critical to the success
of a movement or a new idea. By any means necessary, one must get their (active or passive)
support—because if it isn’t forthcoming, the combined might of the reactionary and the liberal
elite will squash the left.
Fortunately, the last 150 years of Western history have taught us that when crisis afflicts society,
much of the “liberal” section of the elite is willing to favor measures that benefit the populace and
are not dictated solely by the short-term interest of the capitalist class (or some narrow sector of
it). There exist wealthy allies, or at least non-enemies, of environmentalism, public education and
other public resources, civil liberties, the labor movement, infrastructure development, and the
social and solidarity economy. As the reign of neoliberalism deepens the crises that beset the
world, more and more entities in the ruling class will divert more and more resources to assuaging
popular discontent, in many cases by funding radical new initiatives such as have been surveyed
here. The rot that runs through traditional government and civil society makes this
“experimentalism” utterly predictable—because “desperate times call for desperate measures.”
It is instructive to contrast, again, the present situation with that eighty or a hundred years ago.
Aside from the comparatively serious and multifaceted nature of contemporary crises, there are
crucial differences between the periods that should hearten present-day radicals. Certainly the
national and international left does not appear to be in great shape at the moment. On the other
hand, a closer look reveals glimmers of hope. First of all, popular movements potentially have far
more resources available to them now than in the 1930s or before. Technology is infinitely more
advanced than it was, making possible global resistance movements and more effective
coordination between them. Electronic media make it easier to publicize, on a wider scale, projects
in an alternative economy and politics. Society is awash in wealth and knowledge, which, although
it’s concentrated at the top now, could be harnessed and used for the benefit of “the 99 percent”
and their dissent. Many of the people who will be in dire economic straits in the coming decades
are highly educated, college graduates, articulate and aware, who were raised with high

expectations and are likely to be radicalized relatively easily. Moreover, their education and former
position in the middle class will probably ensure that their protest is less ineffectual than that of
some more marginal group might be.
From one perspective, the fragmentation of the contemporary left isn’t even a terrible thing. For it
arises, in part, from the fragmentation of society itself, the dissolution of an integral capitalist civil
society and the nation-state. A decaying social fabric—and a decaying national state—signifies,
in the long run, a decaying corporate capitalism, a doomed civilization. It was different during the
Great Depression, though: then, it was clear very quickly to far-seeing liberals that what was
necessary to save capitalism was a stronger state, more state intervention in the economy, and
stronger labor unions to bargain for high wages and so keep demand high and the economy
running. With the strengthening of the state and unions would come a repairing of the social fabric
and, in fact, the heyday of the nation-state system. Now, ninety years later, no one has a clear idea
of how to save society (neoliberal globalization having made Keynesian nationalism
impracticable)—which, in a sense, is a good thing for radicals, because it suggests that we really
are approaching the end of the capitalist epoch. Systems and institutions are floundering; the left,
for now, is floundering, as is the center, as is (in some cases) the right. But all this floundering
opens up space for “decentralized” innovation, grassroots experimentation, localism and
regionalism, under-the-radar moves toward cooperativism. This slow, semi-interstitial process is
the natural way in which social (economic) systems yield to their successors.
Another respect in which the present has promise is that its transnational framework militates
against fascism. Whatever revolutionary potential the 1930s had was vitiated by the consolidation
of state capitalism, which in this early phase was easily susceptible to fascism, or “palingenetic
ultra-nationalism.”105 Fascist movements marched all over Europe in the 1930s, and in some cases
they achieved total or partial control of the state. After all, they were useful to certain sections of
the ruling class in their struggle to beat back the labor movement, Socialists, and Communists. At
present, the same goal exists among similar reactionary entities of beating back the labor
movement and progressivism of whatever form, and, as we have seen with business support of the
Tea Party and Donald Trump, some of these entities are even willing to bankroll proto-fascist
movements for this purpose. It is also true that as the middle class declines, one can expect many
of the aggrieved to have sympathy with right-wing causes and organizations. This fact presents
clear dangers for the left.
Nevertheless, the dangers are surely not what they were in the 1930s. The point, again, is that the
world is simply too interconnected now, and transnational corporations have too much power, for
a return to the era of sovereign and autonomous nations to occur. In the thirties it was easier to
assemble and consolidate the political apparatus of reactionary ultra-nationalism than it is in an
age of advanced globalization, unparalleled access to information from global sources, widespread
higher education, and greater political sophistication among the elite than when they allowed
outright fascist leaders to achieve total power in the early twentieth century. Nor should we
discount the lessons that people and institutions have learned from the experiences with Italian
Fascism and German Nazism. Historical memory is not always acute, but in this case its power is
not insignificant. Proto-fascist movements can do enormous damage, but the possibility seems
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minimal that they will decisively take over many national governments and start World War III.
Worldwide, it is likely that far more people will join progressive movements than fascist ones.
As for the much-discussed decline of the middle class, there are silver linings in this. One would
be a fool to deny it is causing untold human suffering and is a fundamental manifestation, even a
cause, of the horrors that are wrecking society.106 A Marxian, “dialectical” standpoint, however,
which sees the good in the bad and vice versa, can complicate the narrative of unmitigated
catastrophe. For the “middle class”—by no means a monolithic entity—has tended to be the
bastion of centrist conservatism, the ballast that has steadied the course of capitalism (or,
frequently, turned it to the right). No transition to post-capitalism could have occurred as long as
the middle class was stable and intact, because few people whose material circumstances are
satisfactory would ever give that up to fight for the mere hope, and the very risky prospect, of a
completely different social system.107 That is to say, as long as traditional labor unionism was
strong, thus keeping the middle class strong, revolutionary hopes were doomed. Unions and
collective bargaining had to decline—as did the welfare state—in order for radical possibilities to
open up. This is an unpleasant and ironic truth that many leftists prefer to deny, but it is true. As I
have argued, a post-capitalist order never could have happened within the corporatist framework
of the nation-state; and industrial unionism and the welfare state were essential components of the
mature Western nation-state. So they had to go. (And they were bound to go sooner or later, given
capital’s aggressiveness and its increasing mobility on a global scale.) In any case, capitalism
cannot end except in the context of economic crisis, as Marx sensibly argued. And crisis on the
scale necessary is incompatible with the existence of a large and protected middle class. So the
decline of this “class,” while presenting dangers in the form of proto-fascism, is a necessary
prerequisite to a transition out of capitalism.108
The old question remains: is such a transition “inevitable,” as many Marxists have thought? Is
corporate capitalism necessarily going to succumb to its own contradictions and to the crises, and
resistance, it engenders? On this question, too, I’m an optimist, as I indicated above. For one thing,
no social system is permanent; everything in history is transitory and in flux. More substantively,
I agree with István Mészáros: “The fraudulence and domination of capital and the exploitation of
the working class cannot go on forever. The producers cannot be kept constantly and forever under
control.”109 Indeed, the inevitability of the current social order’s demise seems so obvious to me I
can scarcely argue for it. The facts speak for themselves: no civilization can possibly weather all
the crises that are in their infancy now. Radical reforms are inevitable.
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One way the future may play out is that such reforms, eventually supported by much of the elite,
continue to spread globally for many decades as social instability increases. They build up a
constituency that acquires a vested interest in their maintenance and expansion. Since national
governments and bureaucracies are simultaneously becoming ever more dysfunctional and
inadequate to the task of ensuring social order, the “reforms” frequently amount to a partial ceding
of powers to the regional, local, and international scales. Military and police repression of far-left
movements continues in many places, and such movements or parties are rarely permitted to
capture national governments (because they’re too important), but on less visible scales, such as
the local and regional, “the people” do have more and more say in governance—because the elite
finds it necessary to make some concessions, and it is less dangerous to do so on lower levels of
governance than on higher levels. Nevertheless, even on the level of national governments one can
predict that the left makes slow progress—simply because the right can’t control things forever,
otherwise society would completely collapse. The left’s increasing success is partly a result, too,
of the fact that the ranks of the hyper-elite are thinning due to the repeated bursting of economic
bubbles, the protraction of economic crisis, and the consequent colossal destruction of wealth.
As the centers of global capitalism become more preoccupied with internal problems while having
fewer resources to devote to policing world politics on behalf of corporate interests, left-wing
movements in the global South have greater success against their governments. Quite possibly,
democratic initiatives such as have been pursued in Kerala, India become more common, as do
participatory budgeting, public banking, and comparable experiments. This gives more resources
to the left, which therefore grows. Social and physical infrastructure continues to decay in places
where the right still has control and improves where the left does—but, because the left is growing,
the long-term trends are largely positive. Environmental destruction and economic stagnation
counteract these trends, but in many regions governments are able to alleviate the effects of these
negative forces by, for instance, establishing cooperatives, coordinating the distribution of
resources to where they’re needed most, and perhaps nationalizing industries. Regarding the
natural environment, the severity of the crises and the clamoring of the people finally force
governments to take substantive measures against global warming and other forms of ecological
destruction—although for centuries to come, environmental disasters are doubtless frequent and
devastating. Indeed, billions of people in the next century are, surely, severely affected by global
warming and associated calamities, so that innumerable inter- and intra-governmental
organizations are established to address these problems (through geoengineering, for example).
On local levels, governments tolerate and even encourage the proliferation of “solidarity
institutions” we cannot presently foresee to mitigate the impact of extreme weather patterns.
In general, the only adequate way to respond to crisis is by taking measures that are the opposite
of privatization and marketization. This fact alone should make a leftist optimistic with respect to
the long run. As the world’s corporate sector faces declining profits from global overproduction
and underconsumption, and even the financial industry is suffering from replays of the 2008
collapse, its resistance to progressive movements becomes less effective than it once was. More
and more corporations succumb to bankruptcy, and, as I suggested a moment ago, industries
critical to societal well-being may well be nationalized. In short, over generations, the character of
the economy, society, and politics changes such that the “public sphere” expands, albeit typically
in less centralized and nationalistic ways than in the mid-twentieth century. After a long evolution,
new modes of producing and distributing resources have spread around the world, modes we

cannot clearly anticipate at present. What national governments will look like at this point is
impossible to predict, except that they will probably be attenuated relative to the growth of other
political forms. Certainly the principle of nationality itself will be hollowed out, since it will hardly
serve economic purposes any longer.110 The corporate capitalist class will have so thinned by this
point that in many countries it will be possible for the “working class” (now in a different form,
much of it consisting of members of cooperatives and other economically democratic
organizations) to effectively take over national governments and continue to transform them into
mere extensions and enablers of lower-level and higher-level administrative apparatuses.
Throughout this long history there will have occurred innumerable bloody clashes between armed
enforcers of the status quo and proponents of democracy, but, as history shows, pure repression
cannot work forever. Maybe 150 years from now, things will have started to settle down and the
contours of the post-capitalist global order will be clear.
As for that beloved left-wing concept “the dictatorship of the proletariat,” it may be possible to
speak of some such thing in the later stages of this history, after the capitalist class has lost much
of its economic power. (Recall that the “dictatorship of the bourgeoisie” was not possible until
capitalist classes had already, over centuries, accumulated significant economic power.) But a socalled proletarian dictatorship will certainly not begin the process of change, contrary to Marxist
assumptions for over a hundred years. Such a notion is blatantly idealistic. There has to be a
material basis, a basis of material strength—and a prior partial transformation of economic
relations (which is another aspect of the “material basis”)—for the final, total conquest of political
power and transformation of political relations.
—What I’ve described here is one possible scenario, a relatively optimistic one. It doesn’t seem
wildly implausible, though. The premise underlying it is the commonsense truth that corporate
capitalism and privatization are unsustainable, i.e., a popular reaction against them is inevitable.
Given this fact, the foregoing scenario is one plausible account of the future. It does leave out such
eventualities as nuclear war or the destruction of most of the human species by global warming,
neither of which is out of the question. Another unpredictable variable is the politics of white rage,
i.e., fascism or proto-fascism, which may be manipulated and co-opted by interests with a stake in
imperialist rivalries, for example between the U.S. and China.111 Nonetheless, whatever scenario
one concocts, it is surely inevitable that modes of economic, social, and political cooperation will
evolve to partially or totally replace the privatized competition that has led humanity to the brink
of catastrophe. If most of the species is destroyed, for instance, democratic cooperation will
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probably be essential to the survival of the remaining humans. Certainly corporate capitalism will
no longer exist.
It is largely futile to speculate on the future of the market or whether new forms of barter or
economic planning will emerge. What is clear is that, for all the reasons I’ve given, no other model
of revolution than the “gradualist” one I’ve sketched is relevant to a transition from capitalism to
a more just society. Worker cooperatives may well be an important element in the accumulation
of resources by leftists and “the people” that is necessary for the latter ultimately to achieve
political power. The recognition among unions that a “social movement unionism” has become
necessary will cause more to promote and form cooperatives, even as more workers follow the
example of Argentinians after 2001 by taking over businesses in the wake of economic collapse
and turning them into co-ops.
Incidentally, these happenings provide an opportunity for us to observe history’s elegant, albeit
inhuman, symmetry and logic: while the wave of worker cooperatives in the U.S. in the late
nineteenth century succumbed to an ascendant corporate capitalism, the wave that is just beginning
now—a product of comparable conditions of inequality and economic “anarchy”—will continue
to build as its nemesis corporate capitalism dies. Thus, cooperative movements sprang up in the
fractured dawn, or pre-dawn, of an era in the 1870s and 1880s, and they spring up at its fractured
dusk—only to enjoy a success they could not earlier when their nemesis was in its childhood rather
than its old age (and when they themselves didn’t have the resources to which they have access
now). Neoliberalism has thereby been an unwitting tool of the “cunning” of historical reason, by
precipitating the demise of the very order whose consummation it was and making possible the
rise of a new one.
This gradual social revolution whose logic I have tried to describe will be grounded at all stages
in the gradually changing relations of production. As I have indicated, this thesis, despite its
heterodox appearance, is a strict application of historical materialism, in fact more strict than
Marx’s own vague, idealistic, and impatient prognostications about a proletarian dictatorship (or
rather dozens of such dictatorships around the world) “smashing” a state still situated in a
thoroughly capitalist economy. There will be no “all-at-once” insurgent or electoral working-class
overthrow of the capitalist state; instead, there will be—unless humanity descends into
barbarism—an incremental, albeit frequently “ruptural” and violently contested, transformation
of political and social practices in concert with the centuries-long transformation worldwide of
production relations from capitalist and competitive to democratic and largely cooperative.
“Bottom-up” changes (in popular organization) and “top-down” changes (in state policies,
influenced by the election of leftists to political office) will reinforce and, as it were, assist each
other. Thus, we see that the doctrines of a properly understood Marxism and the anarchistic
practices of the solidarity economy are perfectly harmonious—except that, as Marxists have
always argued, political (including electoral) action is an essential component in the project of
building new “solidarity” institutions.
Marxists’ continuing reluctance to question and revise political formulations, analyses, and slogans
from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, conceived in political and economic
circumstances very different from those today, is an unfortunate product of the tendency to
approach the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Luxemburg, and other classic thinkers as if they are

holy writ, the touchstone of all that is revolutionary. Deviations from dogma invite the charge of
heresy and result in one’s marginalization. The predictable consequence is that theory stagnates
and remains behind the times, becoming little more than the outdated, residual ideology of small
left-wing sects.
At a time when the left is finally seeing the glimmers of rejuvenation, surely we can do better.

